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INTRODUCTION

T

he astonishing and persisting economic growth without a
sound rule of law scheme in China has long been observed
as an intriguing but troublesome mismatch. 1 The myth can
largely be attributed to the inapplicability in China of the deterministic causal relationship between economic development
and the rule of law, a conviction generally held by scholars of
law and economics.2 The premise of such a line of reasoning is
*Assistant Professor, City University of Hong Kong. My special thanks go to
the editors of the Brooklyn Journal of International Law for their insightful
and professional edits. All errors are my own.
1. Apart from economists, quite a large number of legal scholars have
devoted their research to this issue. Representative works include RANDALL
PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002); JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 86
(Randal Peerenboom ed., 2010); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES:
THREATS TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE REST? 34 (2007); Donald C. Clarke,
Legislating for a Market Economy in China, in CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS, NEW CHALLENGES 13, 14 (Donald C. Clarke ed., 2008); ULRIC
KILLION, MODERN CHINESE RULES OF ORDER: PARADOX OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
189 (2007); STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER
MAO 102 (2002); Yongqin Wang, Understanding Economic Development and
Institutional Change: East Asian Development Model Reconsidered with Implications for China, 16 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 47, 48 (2011).
2. This understanding first starts from the differentiation between common law regimes and civil law regimes. According to the Legal Origin theory,
common law regimes tend to have better performance in capital markets and
economic development in general. For a brief but apt summary, see John
Ohnesorge, China’s Economic Transition and the New Legal Origins Literature, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 485, 487 (2003). For legal origin theory, see Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shelifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 298 (2008). According
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the existence of a simplistic, linear causal relationship between
a country’s institutional framework and its observed economic
performance.3 In essence, the separation of power among the
legislature, the judiciary, and the executive administration sets
up a sound framework in which the necessary, if not sufficient,
conditions for healthy economic development are said to be in
place. 4 Economic development without such a framework is
seemingly in conflict with this traditional wisdom.
Along with such a line of reasoning, development must occur
through a dramatic shift, as happened when the Soviet Union
and its former satellites abandoned communism, and replaced it
with the democratic legal framework of the dominant Western

to La Porta et al., “legal origins—broadly interpreted as highly persistent
systems of social control of economic life—have significant consequences for
the legal and regulatory framework of the society, as well as for economic
outcomes.” Id. at 326.
3. For a critical review of the Legal Origin theory, see Ruth Aguilera &
Cynthia Williams, “Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, Incomplete, and Important,
6 BYU L. REV. 1413 (2009), and the three fallacies—”the extrapolation fallacy”
(by extending a conclusion at micro-levels to complex systems), “the transmission problem” (the unclear consequential link between legal origin, company law, and stock markets), and “the exogeneity paradox” (the assumption
that legal institution can be separated)—identified by Professor Katharina
Pistor. See Katharina Pistor, Rethinking the “Law and Finance” Paradigm, 6
BYU L. REV. 1647, 1648–62 (2009).
4. This can largely be attributed to the then widely promoted Washington
Consensus, which was coined by John Williamson and targeted reform policies
for Latin America. Among the ten original themes, the final theme is “The
legal system should provide secure property rights without excessive costs and
make these available to the informal sector.” As stated by Williamson:
“Shortly after I had written my 1989 paper, I began to get interested in the
transition from communism to a market economy that was then in its early
stages. It soon became clear that institutional issues were, or at least should
be, at the heart of the transition, and that one of the most critical actions was
defining property rights.” See John Williamson, Senior Fellow, Inst. for Int’l
Econ., The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development, A
Lecture in the Series “Practitioners of Development” 11 (Jan. 13, 2004). Criticism against the Washington Consensus has long been in existence. See David
Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a
Decade of Reform, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 973, 973–74 (2006); Charles Gore, The Rise
and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries, 28 WORLD DEV. 789 (2000).
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economies.5 This process of transformation was conducted at a
huge cost and the long-term implications are still too early to
tell.6
In stark contrast to the aforementioned transformation, China
follows an alternative “evolutionary” approach, which is
“piecemeal, partial, incremental, [and] often experimental.” 7
While the efficacy of the Chinese approach has been made
manifest in Chinese economic development over the past thirty
years, its incongruence with the generally accepted theory of
law and economics scholars presents some interesting areas for
analysis.
To understand this phenomenon, legal scholars have been
approaching it from a combination of backgrounds in sociology,
economics, and political science. Among those approaches, recent developments in Systems Theory,8 the Complexity Theo5. See David Lipton & Jeffrey Sachs, Creating a Market Economy in
Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 75, 75–77; David Lipton & Jeffrey Sachs, Privatization in Eastern
Europe: The Case of Poland, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 293
(1990). Also, for a comment on shock therapy, see Peter Murrell, What Is
Therapy? What Did It Do in Poland and Russia, Post-Soviet Affairs, 9
POST-SOVIET AFF. 111 (1993).
6. The bleak picture can be observed in Theodore Gerber & Michael Hout,
More Shock than Therapy: Market Transition, Employment, and Income in
Russia, 1991–1995, 104 AMER. J. SOC. 1, 3–6 (1998). But see generally Vladimir
Popov, Shock Therapy Versus Gradualism Reconsidered: Lessons from Transition Economies after 15 Years 1 (Ctr. for Econ. & Fin. Res. at New Econ. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 68, 2006). The author first separated the transformation
period into two stages: the transformational recession, and the recovery and
the process of economic growth. Several factors contributed to the former recession, which include the distortions in industrial structure, trade patterns
accumulated during the period of central planning, and the collapse of state
institutions during transition period. As the ill-effects of the former factors
gradually disappeared in the recovery stage, the positive effects of the ongoing
liberalization on economic growth became apparent. Still, the author admonished that “institutional capacity and reasonable macroeconomic policy” are
prerequisites for successful economic growth.
7. Justin Yinfu Lin, Lessons of China’s Transition from a Planned Economy to a Market Economy (Leon Kozminski Acad. of Entrepreneurship &
Mgmt. (WSPiZ) & Tiger Distinguished Lectures Series No. 16, Dec. 17, 2004),
available at http://www.tiger.edu.pl/publikacje/dist/lin.pdf.
8. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Martin Albrow
ed., Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., 1985); GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS
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ry,9 and the Complex Adaptive System (CAS) theory10 are of
special relevance. The adaptation of the Systems Theory from
biology to social science has long been credited to Niklas Luhmann, who developed two key concepts—operational closure
and structural coupling—to understanding the autopoietic development of a social system.11 For a systems theorist, a system
is embedded within an environment composed of other systems.12 Due to the internal operational closure and the strucAN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 16 (Anne Bankowska & Ruther Adler Blackwell
trans., 1993). Though the theory itself has been criticized as too abstract to be
meaningful in practice, some legal scholars have been trying to apply it to
specific sectors of law. See, e.g., Simon Deakin, Evolution for Our Time: A
Theory of Legal Memetics (ESRC Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge,
Working
Paper
No.
242),
available
at
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP242.pdf; Simon Deakin & Fabio Carvalho,
Systems and Evolution in Corporate Governance (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.
(ECGI)—Law, Working Paper No.150/2010, Apr. 2, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1581746.
9. SUNNY AUYANG, FOUNDATIONS OF COMPLEX-SYSTEM THEORIES IN
ECONOMICS, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, AND STATISTICAL PHYSICS (1998); ROBERT
NORTHROP, INTRODUCTION TO COMPLEXITY AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS (2011);
CHAOS THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS
(Douglas Kiel & Euel Elliot eds., 1996).
10. JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE (2007); YIN SHAN &
ANG YANG, APPLICATIONS OF COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS (2008). The general
thesis is that social systems can be deemed CASs.
11. See the following discussion in Part I.
12. According to Luhmann, society as a system is subdivided into subsystems by a principle of functional differentiation:

One can describe a society as functionally differentiated as soon as it
develops its main subsystems with a view towards specific problems
which then will have to be resolved within the frame of every corresponding functional system. This implies to renounce to a fixed hierarchy among functions . . . Instead of such a hierarchy . . . one should
establish the rule according to which every system takes its own
function to take precedence over others and then conceives of others
functional systems—and in fact of society as a whole—as its environment.
Julien Broquet, Taking Full Advantage of Niklas Luhmann’s Conceptual Apparatus? Governance at the Stake of a Three-way Differentiation 3 (Int’l Univ.
Ctr. [IUC], Conference: Applied System Theory: Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of
Self-Referential Systems: Theoretical and Empirical Research, Dubrovnik,
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tural coupling with the external environment, a system must be
studied within a network of systems. 13 An inference can accordingly be drawn that co-evolution of a system and its environment is an inherent feature of the Systems Theory.
Alternatively, the Complexity Theory and the CAS theory
supplement our understanding of the autopoiesis of systems by
exploring the complexity of the co-evolution process. For Holland, CASs are “systems that involve many components that
adapt or learn as they interact.”14 In a similar vein, Ruhl deems
a CAS something “comprised of a macroscopic, heterogeneous
set of autonomous agents interacting and adapting in response
to one another and to external environment inputs.”15 It thus
follows that social systems, including the legal system, the
Croatia,
Sept.
14–18,
2009),
available
at
http://www.u-picardie.fr/~LaboERSI/travaux/fichiers/T595.pdf (quoting and
translating from NIKLAS LUHMANN, POLITIQUE ET COMPLEXITÉ 43–44 (1990),
translated from SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLÄRUNG 4: BEITRÄGE ZUR FUNKTIONALEN
DIFFERENZIERUNG DER GESELLSCHAFT (1987)). For Seidl, “[f]unctional systems
constitute environment for each other.” This is because each system has its
own language of a set of binary code and reproduces by self-reference. And
“[t]he different systems are merely structurally coupled to each other, i.e. their
structures are adjusted to each other in such a way as to allow them to react to
their respective operations.” See David Seidl, Luhmann’s Theory of Autopoietic
Social Systems 14 (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Munich Sch. of
Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2004-2, 2004). For the purpose of this article, the
political system, legal system, and economic system are subsystems of the
social system. Each of the three constitutes the part of the environment of
some other subsystem of the social system. To facilitate discussion in this
article, we assume that the social system constitutes the political system, the
legal system, and the economic system only.
13. See generally Seidl, supra note 12.
14. John H. Holland, Studying Complex Adaptive Systems, 19 J. SYS. SCI. &
COMPLEXITY 1, 1 (2006).
15. J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 887
(2008). For Rihani, Complex Adaptive Systems share the following traits:
“They have active internal elements that furnish sufficient local variety to
enable the system to survive as it adapts to unforeseen circumstances. The
systems’ elements are lightly but not sparsely connected. The elements interact locally according to simple rules to provide the energy needed to maintain stable global patterns, as opposed to rigid order or chaos. Variations in
prevailing conditions result in many minor changes and a few large mutations,
but it is not possible to predict the outcome in advance.” See SAMIR RIHANI,
COMPLEX SYSTEMS THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE UNDERSTANDING
NON-LINEAR REALITIES, 80 (2002).
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economic system, and the political system can be termed as
CASs.16 According to these theories, the co-evolution process
places CASs almost always at the edge of chaos, though emergence of order may spontaneously occur.17 However, internal
attractors and attractor basins capture the chaos, indicating
16. For the economic system as a CAS, see Herbert Gintis, The Economy as
a Complex Adaptive System (2006) (reviewing ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE
ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE RADICAL REMAKING OF
ECONOMICS
(2006)),
available
at
http://www.umass.edu/preferen/Class%20Material/Readings%20in%20Marke
t%20Dynamics/Complexity%20Economics.pdf; COMPLEX SYSTEMS IN FINANCE
AND ECONOMETRICS (Robert A. Myers ed., 2010); John Foster, Economic System, in PHILOSOPHY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS, 10 HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 508, 509–30 (Cliff Hooker et. al. eds., 2011), available at
http://www.arabphilosophers.com/English/news/books/Philosophy_of_Comple
x_Systems.pdf. But for an opposing view, see John Foster, Why Is Economics
Not a Complex Systems Science? (Univ. of Queensland Sch. of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 336, 2004) (Austl.). For the political system as CAS, see Bennett Stark, A Case Study of Complex Adaptive Systems Theory: Sustainable
Global Governance: The Singular Challenge of the Twenty-First Century (Univ.
of Ljubljana, RISC-Research Paper No. 5, July 2009) (Slovn.); Ken Kollman,
John H. Miller & Scott E. Page, Political Parties and Electoral Landscapes, 1
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 139 (1998); Gary Marks, Rational Sources of Chaos in Democratic Transition, 35 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 397 (1992); Kiel & Elliott, supra note 9,
pt. 2; Jenna Bednar, The Political Science of Federalism, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 269 (2011). For the legal system as CAS, see J.B. Ruhl, Complex Adaptive
Systems Literature, VANDERBILT UNIV. SOC’Y FOR EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS IN
LAW,
available
at
https://www4.vanderbilt.edu/seal/scholarly-resources/complex-adaptive-syste
ms-literature; John Mixon & Kathleen McGlynn, A New Zoning and Planning
Metaphor: Chaos and Complexity Theory, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1221 (2006); Doni
Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a
Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 457–58, 506, 521–22 (2012);
Gregory Todd Jones, Dynamical Jurisprudence: Law as a Complex System, 24
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 873, 882–83 (2008).
17. The chaos however is only the appearance. Chaos may “exist at detailed
levels” but an order may emerge at the global level. RIHANI, supra note 15, at 7.
As the chaos increases, emergence of qualities unforeseen at the level of individual elements of the system come into existence. In fact, some orderly qualities may be observed, as occurs with swarms of fireflies that will flash at the
same time and same frequency. On this, Strogatz observes: “For reasons we
don’t yet understand, the tendency to synchronize is one [of] the most pervasive drives in the universe, extending from atoms to animals, from people to
planets.” See STEVEN STROGATZ, SYNC: THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF
SPONTANEOUS ORDER 14 (2003).
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that a system is capable of stabilizing itself.18 Such dynamic
equilibriums of CASs are the result of continuing feedback or
learning processes between agents within a system, and between a system and its environment.19 In turn, the sustainable
18. The development path of complex systems is captured by attractors,
“the closed set of states a system repeatedly traverses when at equilibrium.”
See Cliff Hooker, Introduction to Philosophy of Complex Systems, in
PHILOSOPHY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS, supra note 16, at 3, 24. Three types attractors have been identified: (1) point attractors—equilibrium points where
the system will tend to and then stop; (2) cyclical attractors—as what the
pendulum does between two points; and (3) strange chaotic attractors in
non-linear complex systems—the development path always distinct from the
past path, an unpredictable evolutionary process that is decided by initial
conditions. The strange chaotic attractors are thus relevant to the current
study. For organized complex systems, there are a large number of attractors,
which are similar but not identical. RIHANI, supra note 15, at 8, 78–80. However, the difference between attractors is within specific limits.
In general, a disturbance to a system at equilibrium will lead the system into one of three situations: (1) stay put within the current attractor basin;
(2) be pushed to another attractor basin but of the same fitness landscape; or
(3) transform to another attractor basin of a new fitness landscape. Though
internal variations happen all the time, the system remains stable in the sense
that it does not escape the attraction of existing attractors of the existing
fitness landscape, or the picture of the whole system cannot easily change into
another global pattern attracted by another set of attractors. If the latter
happens, the structure of the system changes. Thus, it is the existence of these
attractors that explains the emergence of order in seemingly chaotic systems.
See Hooker, supra, at 23–25.
But notice that compared with the point attractor or cyclical attractors,
the strange chaotic attractors provide more flexibility resilience to the system.
See J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the
Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1440–42 (1996); GRAHAM ROOM, COMPLEXITY,
INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY, AGILE DECISION-MAKING IN A TURBULENT
WORLD 129–36 (2011); Jamie Murray, Complexity Theory & Socio-legal Studies, 29 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 227 (2008).
Still, it must be mentioned that some minor variation may initiate a
catastrophe through which the current equilibrium state of the system will
shift into a totally different state with a new set of attractors. The intriguing
issue is we cannot know beforehand which variation at what time will lead to
the catastrophe. Accordingly, catastrophes are generally not welcomed in our
discussion.
19. In Luhmann’s words, this is a recursive reference process, including
both the internal self-reference and the external structural coupling between
the system and its environment. Specifically, “[c]ommunication comes about
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growth of a system is decided not only by the quality of the
system on its own but also, more importantly, by the compatibility of the system with those other systems that make up its
environment. The importance of such an understanding is at
least twofold. First, the co-evolution between and among systems seriously constrains the application of the traditional
wisdom that operates under the presumption that there is a
simplistic, linear one-way causal relationship to be identified.
Second, the role of a regulator in CASs is better deemed an
adaptive manager who is good at understanding and responding
to the dynamic and continuing learning process of the elements
within systems.20
The application of such theories to China demands an understanding of the sui generis Chinese characteristics: Confucianism, Chinese Communist Party (“CCP” or the “Party”) control,
and strong, centralized government control, which reveal a distinctive configuration of the autopoiesis of Chinese systems. In
contrast to the rather strong operational closure of the legal
system in Western countries, the Chinese legal system has a
relatively weak internal operational closure and a strong, but
nearly one-way, structural coupling in which it is subjugated to
both the economic system (at least during the fast growth period) and the political system.21 With such a configuration of
autopoiesis, the Chinese legal system has been adapting on dual
track schemes and via experiments, yielding meaningful experiences that can be put to use on a wider scope. Additionally, the
adaptive efficiency of China’s system requires strong compatibility among different systems. Indeed, both the dominant CCP
control and strong central government control have largely been
employed to support economic growth. Specifically, deregula-

by splitting reality through a highly artificial distinction between utterance
and information, both taken as contingent events within an ongoing process
that recursively uses the results of previous steps and anticipates future ones.”
See Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1424 (1992).
20. Even though Ruhl is describing the recent development in American
court management, the quotation is applicable to the trial-and-error style
adaptive walk. See J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in
the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424, 428 (2010).
21. See infra Part II.
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tion to local governments, which provides opportunities to apply
trial-and-error techniques, is put to effective use by strong central and CCP control in coupling or learning between patches of
the system. 22 Effective and efficient learning processes may
accordingly have been achieved for the whole system. Retrospectively, the government has largely realized its role as an
adaptive manager of CASs.
The structure of the Article is as follows. Part I will give a
brief introduction to the systems theories. Next, Part II will
describe sui generis Chinese Characteristics. This background
information will then be used to apply the Systems Theory to
the adaptation of Chinese legal systems in Part III, and show in
Part IV how the compatibility among different systems has
contributed to persistent economic growth in China over the
past thirty years.
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Systems Theory
By adapting the autopoiesis of organizations in biology, Niklas
Luhmann develops the Systems Theory for social science.23 For
biologists, autopoiesis implicates both self-reference and
self-reproduction of elements of biological organizations. 24
Self-reference refers to a development process relying on the
interactions among and between internal constituent elements
of an organization; self-reproduction is a concomitant result of
22. “Patch” has a special meaning in Complexity Theory. The idea is attributed to Stuart Kauffman, who created this concept in his book. STUART
KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE 252–57 (2000). Patches are decision-making units of a complex adaptive system, which do not overlap but are
coupled with each other. In China, the provinces can appropriately be deemed
patches, which is similar to the well-known models of “competitive federalism.” For an application of the patching theory to decision making, see David
Post & David Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: Towards a New
Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1055 (1998).
23. See supra note 5.
24. HUMBERTO R. MATURANA & FRANCISCO J. VARELA, Introduction, in
AUTOPOIESIS AND COGNITION: THE REALIZATION OF THE LIVING, available at
http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Maturana/autopoesis_
and_cognition.pdf.

2014]

A SYSTEMS THEORIST’S PERSPECTIVE

169

this self-referential process.25 Viewed from this feature alone,
organizations are autopoietic in that they are operationally
closed.
In social science, Luhmann defines a system through the
process of delineating a system from its environment, which is
comprised of a number of other systems.26 Within a system, a
program using a language of a binary code dictates the operation of the elements of the system. 27 Interactions between a
system and its external environment are achieved by structural
coupling, meaning the communication of information or learning in social science.28 Given that a system is embedded within
its environment, structural coupling provides important information conduits between a system and its environment.
It shall be noted that both internal and external pressures
may initiate a coupling process. 29 For instance, abrupt envi25. For Luhmann, “[s]ocial systems can only reproduce themselves by (always self-referential) communication.” See Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the
Legal System, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 16
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1987). Also, for Luksha, “By all means,
self-reproduction must be self-referential, because it (a) requires system to
operate on itself, (b) requires a system to maintain a representation (or some
kind of description) of itself.” Pavel Luksha, Society as a Self-Reproducing
System, 2 J. SOCIOCYBERNETICS 13, 15 (2001).
26. See the translation by Julien Broquet, supra note 12. The delineation of
a social system and its environment hinges upon the operational closure of the
system in which the binary code is employed. Accordingly, a social system
cannot communicate with its environment but can only be structurally adjusted through structural coupling with the other subsystems in the environment.
27. The binary code can be understood in positive and negative terms. For
instance, in law the binary code is legal or illegal; in politics, power or not in
power; and in economics, possession or non-possession, or payment or nonpayment.
28. Luhmann differentiates a social system from the other living systems
by emphasizing communication, which is a synthesis of selection of information, and utterance. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS 142 (Timothy
Lenoir & Hans Ulricht Gumbrecht eds., John Bednarz, Jr. & Dirk Baecker
trans., 1995). In essence, “the autopoiesis of social systems, i.e. the reproduction of communications through communications.” Seidl, supra note 12, at 9.
See also Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992).
29. HUMBERTO R. MATURANA & FRANCISCO J. VARELA, THE TREE OF
KNOWLEDGE: THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 74
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ronmental changes may demand changes within a system,30 or
the intensive conflicts within a system may change the environment within which the system is embedded. 31 Hence, a
system both influences and is influenced by its environment.
What is emphasized by systems theorists, however, is that external information must be digested by the internal elements to
achieve autonomous self-reproduction. 32 Thus, even though
systems theorists juxtapose structural coupling with operational closure, the former serves the latter and the importance
of structural coupling may easily be downplayed.
The Systems Theory approach departs from the focus of the
traditional wisdom on the simplistic, linear causal relationship
to a network study by considering any given system merely as a
part of some greater network. Also, taking into account coevolution requires a continuing reflexive regulatory approach, according to which the regulator must be proactively responsive to
the information communicated in the co-evolution process. In
other words, too much inflexibility will lead to a rigid regulatory
framework that is unsuitable to the dynamic co-evolution process.
(Shambhala
Publications,
Inc.
rev.
ed.
1987),
available
at
https://umdrive.memphis.edu/blatti/public/PHIL%207-8051%20-%20Ontology
%20of%20Life%20-18.1%20S13/Readings/7-Mar%2018%20-%20Maturana%2
0and%20Varela%20-%20Tree%20of%20Knowledge%20-%20pt%202%20(2).pd
f.
30. Structural changes of antennae and wings of some butterflies were
found recently by Japanese scientists after the collapse of the nuclear power
stations in Fukushima. See Nick Crumpton, “Severe Abnormalities” Found in
Fukushima Butterflies, BBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-19245818.
31. For instance, how decision making in one nation leads to changes to the
world system, as shown by the ramifications of the case of William Marbury v.
James Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), in the US.
32. In contrast with the biological reproduction of individuals, Luhmann
argues that a social system reproduces itself by self-reference, but emphasizes
the role of communication: “Social systems use communication as their particular mode of autopoietic reproduction. Their elements are communications
which are recursively produced and reproduced by a network of communications and which cannot exist outside such a network.” Niklas Luhmann, The
Autpoiesis of Social Systems, in SOCIOCYBERNETIC PARADOXES OBSERVATION,
CONTROL AND EVOLUTION OF SELF-STEERING SYSTEMS 172, 174 (Felix Geyer &
Johnannes van der Zouwen eds., 1986).
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B. The CAS Theory
1. Complexity
While the Systems Theory identifies two key qualities of a
social system—operational closure within the system and
structural coupling between the system and the other systems
in the environment—the recent development of the CAS Theory
helps us better understand the complexity of the co-evolution
between a system and its environment. 33 The study on the
complexity of a system starts from the observation of chaos at
the detailed levels of a system.34 For activities of systems at
detailed levels, simple deterministic biology, physics, and
chemistry rules play their due roles.35 However, once such rules
repeat numerous times, tiny differences in the initial situation
33. Note that Professor Eve Mitleton-Kelly termed social systems as Complex Evolutionary Systems. See Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Ten Principles of Complexity and Enabling Infrastructures, in COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND EVOLUTIONARY
PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONS: THE APPLICATION OF COMPLEXITY THEORY TO
ORGANIZATIONS (Eve Mitleton-Kelly ed., 2003). Mitleton-Kelly argues that:
Although we make a conceptual distinction between a ‘system’ and its
‘environment’ it is important to note that there is no dichotomy or
hard boundary between the two . . . in the sense that a system is
separate from and always adapts to a changing environment. The
notion to be explored is rather that of a system closely linked with all
other related systems within an ecosystem . . . . Within such a context
change needs to be seen in terms of co-evolution with all other related
systems, rather than as adaptation to a separate and distinct environment.
Id. at 29–30.
Still, it must be noted that complex theory itself is full of complexity.
Despite the exponential development for the past thirty years or so, Hooker
observes that “there is no unified science of complex systems . . . the empirical
domain of complex systems is itself complex—at this time irreducibly complex!” Hooker, supra note 18, at 3–90, 5.
34. Edward Lorenz, Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow, 20 J. ATMOSPHERIC
SCI. 130 (1963). The modern Chaos theory originates from Edward Lorenz’s
famous article. Professor Lorenz noticed that a particular meteorological
model is sensitive to minor differences in the initial situation. For a brief introduction to the development of the Chaos theory, see Robert Bishop, Chaos,
in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chaos/#BriHisCha.
35. See Robert Bishop, supra note 34.
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will be amplified and lead to huge differences in the end results. 36 Likewise, a minute disturbance to the normal development process may also lead to unexpected results. 37 The
randomness of the end results is called chaos, which is sensitive
to the initial conditions of a system.38
The above line of reasoning may also be applied to social science studies, as evidenced by the ability of human beings to
learn from the past in planning for the future. Indeed, the autopoiesis of a social system is achieved through such a continuous ongoing information communication process, in which
agents “recursively use the results of previous steps and anticipate future ones.”39 As amplification of tiny differences of the
initial states during the development process is normal, the
application of the traditional linear thinking in social science
may accordingly be constrained.
However, chaos does not provide the whole picture of the
co-evolution of a system and its environment. Complexity theorists also note that the emergence of qualities unforeseen at the
level of individual elements of a system come into existence as
the chaos develops.40 The unanticipated quality may well appear in an orderly way, or, to use the language of complexity
theorists, an order may emerge at the global level despite chaotic localities.41 For instance, synchronization has been widely
observed in both nature and in human society.42 Alternatively,

36. This is not to say that the difference cannot be suppressed, for amplification can be either positive or negative. See Hooker, supra note 18, at 24.
37. See RIHANI, supra note 15, at 80.
38. Id.
39. Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The
Differentiation of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1424 (1992).
40. RIHANI, supra note 15, at 7. For a brief history of emergence and its
implication on social science studies, see Peter A. Corning, The Re-emergence
of Emergence, and the Causal Role of Synergy in Emergent Evolution, 185
SYNTHESE 295 (2012).
41. RIHANI, supra note 15, at 7.
42. See text accompanying note 17 supra. For example, some orderly quality has already been observed in swarms of fireflies, which will flash in the
same place at the same time and with the same frequency. For a recent introduction to the application of sync, see Johan Suykens & Grigory Osipov,
Introduction to Focus Issue: Synchronization in Complex Networks, 18 CHAOS,
037101-1, at -1 to -4 (2008).
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the development process of a system may also be discontinuous
and subject to critical situations, where a minimal perturbation
of the situation may give rise to an abrupt catastrophe to the
whole system.43 Thus, the unpredictable complexity of a dynamic system can be seen as a result of chaos and of how systems and environments are affected by such chaos.
Throughout the ever-changing development process of a system, intermediary states between total chaos and complete order are the norm.44 In fact, a system is at the edge of chaos most
of the time.45 This may not necessarily be inimical for the development of a system. A system at equilibrium does not have
sufficient energy to engender changes in response to alterations
in its environment and may thus degrade into death.46 Nor is it
desirable that a system is in total chaos, as these scenarios are
typically characterized by a failure to function as an organized
system as a result of a proliferation of uncertainty. An appropriate combination of chaos, emergence, and catastrophe thus
helps the system keep an adaptable healthy status.47 On this,
Rihani states:
Too few states produce unvarying order and too many create
chaos: both are dead ends. Poised between the two regimes,
Complexity is the zone where self-organization allows new
stable patterns to emerge and evolve without compromising
the survival of the entire system. In all cases the system must

43. For a specific discussion of chaos, emergence, and catastrophe and their
application in understanding environmental law and the broader
law-and-society system, see J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for
the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 875–93
(1997).
44. This idea is widely attributed to Chris Langton, Computation at the
Edge of Chaos: Phase Transitions and Emergent Computation, 42 PHYSICA D
12 (1990). See also Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1418.
45. See Langton, supra note 44; Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1418.
46. See RIHANI, supra note 15, at 80.
47. Fryer contends that the most productive state is at the edge of chaos,
where maximum variety and creativity provides possibilities of behavior. See
Peter Fryer, A Brief Description of Complex Adaptive Systems and Complexity
MICE
Theory,
TROJAN
http://www.trojanmice.com/articles/complexadaptivesystems.htm (last visited
Aug. 24, 2013).
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have some variety to give it flexibility to withstand unexpected
shocks, but limits on variety are also necessary to avoid chaos.48

In sum, chaos cannot be avoided. Instead, it is internalized
into the dynamic governance scheme of a system. The unanticipated emergence of quality at the level of a system implies that
a whole system cannot be intuitively understood simply
through the identification of individual elements. Accordingly,
it is inadvisable to make ex ante projections of the development
of a whole system on the basis of our knowledge of individual
elements or any subsystem only. Instead, the non-linear interaction characteristic of co-evolution should be introduced to
liberate us from the established constraints of traditional wisdom.
2. Adaptability
The second characteristic of a social system is its adaptability.
In order to describe the adaptation at detailed levels, Stuart
Kauffman introduced the concept of fitness landscapes, which
consist of all possible survival strategies (trajectories) of agents
within a system.49 Normally, the fitness landscape of an agent
is full of peaks, valleys, and planes, indicating that the development path of the agent is not always a simple upward slope to
the maximum of the system.50 However, because no agent has a
“God’s eye view of its entire fitness landscape,” 51 an agent
spends most of his time searching for the local extremum, which
may not necessarily be the global maximum. 52 In addition,
48. RIHANI, supra note 15, at 80.
49. STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ORDER: SELF-ORGANIZATION AND
SELECTION IN EVOLUTION (1993).
50. The concept was first employed to understand the dynamics of evolutionary optimization. A brief introduction on the concept of the fitness landscape can be seen in Peter Stadler, Fitness Landscapes, in BIOLOGICAL
EVOLUTION AND STATISTICAL PHYSICS 187 (Michael Lässig & Angelo Valleriani
eds., 2002). For the application of the concept to legal studies, see Ruhl, supra
note 18.
51. For a brief review of the history of how social scientists accept Darwinian evolutionary theory, see Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1450.
52. A local extremum is the best situation of a subsystem whereas a global
maximum may be understood as the best situation of the social system as a
whole.
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given that the coevolution between a system and the environment the system is embedded in, the fitness landscape is said to
have a fluid nature.53 In turn, a search for a nearby peak may
itself be time consuming and risky, as moving out of the current
niche may court further unexpected risks; for instance, falling
into a low-point or simply running on vast plateaus, both of
which are worse than the option to remain at its current level.
In other words, neither is it effortless for an agent to climb up to
a local extremum, nor is it an easy decision for an agent to move
out of the niche and search for a higher peak once he stays on a
local peak.54
One inference from the above understanding is that if it is
unknown when and where we can find the global peak, more
meaningful trials by agents shall be promoted to achieve the
more efficient and effective adaptation of the system as a whole.
Given that the sensitivity to the initial situation largely limits
the efficacy of a learning process from a foreign environment, it
is advisable to promote the learning process between agents
with similar, if not identical, initial situations.
Such understanding can conveniently be observed in how the
trial-and-error approach to introducing new policies has been
gradually institutionalized in China. For instance, private initiatives to get rid of poverty initially succeeded in rural China.55
Cosseted by the local and central governments, the initial successful efforts largely invigorated similar experimentation
across the whole country.56 In consequence, Township and Village Enterprises (“TVEs”) in rural China contributed to economic growth, a result that Deng Xiaoping and his cohorts had
not foreseen. 57 Once the benefits of these local experiments
53. See RIHANI, supra note 15, at 82.
54. See Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1456–57.
55. Cheng-Gang Xu, The Institutional Foundations of China’s Reforms and
Development 45–46 (Ctr. for Econ. Res. Discussion Paper No. DP7654, May
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1547574.
56. See id. at 15–17.
57. In a meeting with the guests from Yugoslavia on June 12, 1987, Deng
said: “The greatest achievement that was totally unexpected is that rural
enterprises [both TVEs and private enterprises] have developed.” Yingyi Qian,
The Process of China’s Market Transition, 1978–1998: The Evolutionary, Historical, and Comparative Perspectives, in CHINA’S DEEP REFORM: DOMESTIC
POLITICS IN TRANSITION 229, 237 (Lowell Dittmer & Guoli Liu eds., 2006); see
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were realized, the Chinese central government introduced new
policies by promoting the successful experiences within larger
areas.58
On the whole, CAS theorists observe that the adaptation path
of a system is set by attractors, which refer to “the closed set of
states a system repeatedly traverses at equilibrium,”59 and attractor basins, which refer to “the wider set of states [a system]
can pass through while still returning to its attractor.”60 Each
system may have different states of equilibrium but each state
of equilibrium has its own idiosyncratic combination of attractors and attractor basins.61 The change of a system from one
equilibrium state to another is not easy, as the existence of such
attractors and attractor basins makes it hard for the system to
escape the attraction of existing attractors. 62 Indeed, even
though internal variations happen all the time, a system remains stable in the sense that the whole system cannot easily
shift into another global pattern attracted by another set of attractors or attractor basins.63
Due to the existence of attractors and attractor basins, a CAS
is resilient in the sense that a system has the ability to absorb
disturbances and reorganize so as to stay in the same basin of
attraction.64 Resilient CASs have adaptive capacities, a concept

also Ying Fan, N. Chen & D.A. Kirby, Chinese Peasant Entrepreneurs: An
Examination of Township and Village Enterprises in Rural China, 34 J. SMALL
BUS. MGMT. 72 (1996). As Deng admitted, the result “just came out of nowhere.” MICHAEL ELLMAN, SOCIALIST PLANNING 72 (Phyllis Dean et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1989).
58. See Xu, supra note 55, at 45–48.
59. See supra text accompanying note 18.
60. See Hooker, supra note 18, at 24. Hooker employs an example of a ball
rolling in a basin. The point at the bottom where the ball may stop is a point
attractor. If the ball keeps running around the basin wall without falling into a
point at the bottom, then there is a cyclic attractor. A strange chaotic attractor
exists in a non-linear complex system; the famous one is Lorenz’s butterfly
effect.
61. Indeed, “the attractor landscape is the system’s dynamical signature.”
See Hooker, supra note 18, at 24.
62. See supra text accompanying note 18.
63. Id.
64. See generally Brian Walker, C.S. Holling, Stephen R. Carpenter & Ann
Kinzig, Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social-Ecological
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which refers to the ability of a system to “sense threats to system equilibrium and respond by changing resilience strategies
without changing fundamental attributes of the system.”65 In
comparison with the traditional wisdom that law provides certainty, conceptualizing a legal system as a CAS emphasizes how
to improve a legal system’s ability to adapt to the ever-changing
external environment.66
Since different systems have different resilience and adaptive
capacities, adaptability will vary from system to system.67 The
less adaptable or the stickier a system is, the longer period of
time it requires to adapt to a new environment.68 Among the
three systems (legal, political, and economic) being discussed in
this Article, the stickiest system is the political system due to
the fact that China is still a party state. Conversely, the economic system is the least sticky system.
The implication of such a realization is two-fold. First, the
varying adaptability between systems with different degrees of
stickiness may contribute to undesirable catastrophes and to
the collapse of the whole system.69 Thus, the sticky political
Systems,
9
ECOLOGY
&
SOC.
(2004),
available
at
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/.
65. J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89
N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1387 (2011).
66. Id. at 1387–91.
67. Gerard Roland, Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and
Slow-Moving Institutions, 38 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 109 (2004). For Roland,
the cultural system is the stickiest one, and the legal system and the political
system follow in sequence. But since China is a party state, the political system is stickier than the legal system.
68. Id.
69. See XUEYI LU, PEILIN LI & GUANGJIN CHEN (陆学艺，李培林，陈光金 主
编), 2013 NIAN ZHONGGUO SHEHUI XINGSHI FENXI YU YUCE SHEHUI WENXIAN
CHUBAN SHE (2013 年中国社会形势分析与预测， 社会科学文献出版社) [2013
CHINA SOCIETAL ANALYSIS AND FORECAST]（2012). According to their report,
despite the achievement until the Eighteenth National Congress of the CCP,
[A]t this decisive stage, China needs to further adjust the economic
structure, boost domestic consumption, find solutions to growing income inequality, and prevent the rebound of widening income gap. On
the other hand, government also needs to pay more attention to adjust the deficiency of the current employment structure, mitigate the
tension of labor relationship, and rely on innovative strategies to cope
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system may have to be adaptable to the new environment so
that sustainable economic growth can be achieved. Second, the
time lag may provide opportunities to develop different systems
in sequence.70 A government may take advantage of the time
lag to devote its efforts in developing its economy while passively carrying out reforms of the stickier political system so
long as the delay in reform does not degrade the environment.
However, the government must take advantage of the time lag
tactically, without allowing the political system to drag the
greater environment into catastrophe.71
C. Institutional Compatibility
In essence, both the Systems Theory and the CAS Theory
assume an adaptable coevolution between a system and its environment. As shown, the Systems Theory emphasizes operational closure with structural coupling supplementing information from the outside, while the Complexity Theory focuses
on the details of adaptation between a system and its environment.72
with emerging characteristics of mass disturbance. Furthermore, it is
essential for the government to resolve the resistance during the
process of social system reform, strengthen the cooperative mechanism for social management, and change the traditional ideology of
maintaining social order with rigid measures.
Id. (as translated by author).
70. Camilo Olaya, System Dynamics Philosophical Background and Underpinnings, in 1 COMPLEX SYSTEMS IN FINANCE AND ECONOMETRICS 812, 813
(Robert Meyers ed., 2011 ed. 2010).
71. The catastrophic Chongqing Incident can be cited as evidence. Political
errors by Bo Xilai have already been titled as those in the Cultural Revolution.
For the implication of the Chongqing Model, see Suisheng Zhao, The China
Model and the Authoritarian State, E. ASIA FORUM (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/31/the-china-model-and-the-authoritar
ian-state/. For a comparison of the Guangdong Model and the Chongqing
Model, see Dan Steinbock, Guangdong and Chongqing: Two Sides of the Same
US
FOCUS
(Dec.
11,
2012),
Coin,
CHINA
http://www.chinausfocus.com/uncategorized/guangdong-and-chongqing-two-si
des-of-the-same-coin/.
72. International Society for the Systems Sciences (“ISSS”) defines a system
as “a family of relationships between its members acting as a whole.” Matthew
Shapiro et al., The Primer Toolbox, ISSS.ORG (last visited Aug. 25, 2013),
www.isss.org/primer/toolbox.htm. Professor Forrester pointed out, “The con-
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The research derived from the foregoing theories thus deviates from the traditional wisdom that focuses on decision
making by rational individuals to a new perspective on a network study that considers any given system as a part of some
bigger network. A change to any part of the network will thus
effect the situation of other aspects of the network and engender
unexpected implications on the situation of the whole network.
On this point, the argument of Professor Ruhl is pertinent:
The fact of coevolution in dynamical systems is the ultimate
demise of reductionism. No one component can be extracted
from the system, studied in isolation of the system, altered to
fit whatever ideal is in operation for the system, and then inserted back into the system with the expectation that we can
predict the subsequent behavior of either the component or the
system. The alterations of the one component’s schema and
structure will reverberate through the system, causing other
components to alter their schema and structures, with who
knows what as the end result.73

Such understandings may press us for alternative ways to
achieve the ultimate objective of the CAS study, which is to
determine how to achieve the sustainable growth of the whole
system.74 Due to the coevolution among systems that constitute
an environment, the adaptive capacity of the environment as a
whole depends on the compatibility among systems with different adaptive capacities. The objective of how to achieve the
sustainable growth of the whole system is then transformed into
how to achieve institutional adaptability by building up compatibility of the systems. Different from the prior thinking, efforts shall not be devoted only to improving the resilience and

cept of a system implies interaction and interdependence.” See JAY W.
FORRESTER, INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS, 347–48 (1961) (quoted in Olaya, supra note
70, at 815). Empirical evidence also indicates the interrelationships between
and among systems shall be the right target. For instance, in Haggard and
Tiede’s study of the relationship between economic development and the rule
of law, they warn that future studies should pay more attention to the complementarities among rule of law institutions. See Stephan Haggard & Lydia
Tiede, The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where Are We?, 39 WORLD DEV.
673 (2011).
73. See Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1471 n.245.
74. See Ruhl, supra note 18.

180

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:1

adaptive capacity of any independent component system. Rather, compatibility among systems is also, if not more, important to achieve the sustainable growth of the whole system.
Given that every CAS is always at the edge of chaos, a dynamic
compatibility between systems within an environment is accordingly required.
A relevant study here is the research of Davis on the relationship between institutional flexibility and economic growth.75
Davis argues that institutional arrangements must be flexible
to accommodate “continual institutional learning and adaptation.”76 Davis first differentiates between institutional quality
and institutional flexibility, which refers to the ability of creating new institutional arrangements according to environmental development. 77 Davis found that improvement in institutional quality may have “an immediate but temporary”
positive impact on economic growth whereas improvement in
institutional flexibility will lead to “a gradual but persistent”
economic growth. 78 Thus, in comparison with institutional
quality, institutional flexibility is more meaningful for sustainable economic growth. Good economic institutions, according to Davis, may be sufficient to maintain the economy at a
given level but do not necessarily create high or even positive
growth rates of economy. 79 In addition, Davis observes that
“countries with high quality but inflexible institutions will be
rich and stagnant, while countries with low quality but flexible
institutions will be poor and dynamic.”80
For Davis, an emphasis on institutional quality indicates a
static view of the institutional environment, which is in conflict
with the ever-changing reality of the world.81 In comparison,
the focus on institutional flexibility shall in turn attract aca-

75. Lewis Davis, Institutional Flexibility and Economic Growth, 38 J. COMP.
ECON. 306 (2010).
76. Id. at 318.
77. Id.
78. Id. (discussing the positive effects of institutional flexibility on the
economies of Europe and the United States and the negative effects arising
from the lack of institutional flexibility).
79. Id. at 307.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 306.

2014]

A SYSTEMS THEORIST’S PERSPECTIVE

181

demic attention to the “flexible institutional matrix that will
adjust in the context of evolving technological and demographic
changes.” 82 Institutional arrangements of a society shall accordingly be established with an objective to achieve adaptive
efficiency—“the ability of [a society] to adjust flexibly in the face
of shock and evolve institutions that effectively deal with altered reality.”83 This emphasis on dynamic institutional flexibility thus corresponds to the systems theorists’ focus on the
coevolution among and between systems.
II. THE SUI GENERIS CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
Chinese social systems have long been labeled with Chinese
characteristics, a clear indicator of autopoiesis of the Systems
Theory. According to Professor Zhang, Chinese characteristics
refer to two points: Chinese in terms of culture and Socialist in
terms of legal and political systems.84 In essence, these can be
characterized as both Confucian culture and the dominance of
the Chinese Communist Party. However, to explore the relationship between law and economic development, a third characteristic was also identified; i.e., the unique central-local relationship.85 Each trait will be discussed in sequence.

82. Id.
83. Douglass North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change 13
(Mercatus Ctr. of George Mason Univ., Forum Series on the Role of Insts. in
Promoting
Econ.
Growth,
June
24,
2003),
available
at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacx402.pdf. But notice North then deemed
China an intriguing exception, for China “does not have the rule of law, it has
a political dictatorship; it does not have secure property rights—all of which
have under girded the development of the United States and the [W]estern
world.” Id. at 21.
84. Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics:
China’s Discourse for the Rule of Law and a Bitter Experience, 24 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 1 (2010).
85. I interpret Professor Zhang’s assertion that China is socialist in terms
of legal and political systems to mean that the political system, which entails
the legal system, is dominated by the CCP. Furthermore, the way that the
legal regime interacts with economic policy is defined by a unique relationship
betweem local and central government.
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A. Confucianism
The first Chinese characteristic is Confucianism. According to
Confucianism, moral virtues are better governance guidelines
than laws.86 The contrasting philosophy in China is Legalism,
according to which formal rules shall be set up beforehand and
strictly enforced afterwards.87 Under the guidelines of Legalism, rulers are merely professionals who enforce predetermined
laws. 88 Predictability and uniformity are thus commended
merits of Legalism. However, Legalism’s rigidity attracts vehement criticisms from Confucians, who hold that predetermined rules are doomed to be incomprehensive and unable to
deal with the varieties of social life.89 Moreover, laws require
86. JIANPAN CHEN, CONFUCIUS AS A TEACHER 266–71 (1994).
87. A good summary of tenets of both Confucianism and Legalism can be
seen in D. BODDE, ESSAYS ON CHINESE CIVILIZATION (C. LeBlanc & D. Borei eds.
1981) (quoted in David Funk, Traditional Chinese Jurisprudence: Justifying
Li and Fa, 17 S.U. L. REV. 1, 2–4 nn.4–5 (1990)). See also Eric Orts, Rule of
Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 43 (2001).
88. This is the criticism by Han against Confucianism. For Confucianists,
If you try to guide the common people with coercive regulations and
keep them in line with punishments, the common people will become
evasive and will have no sense of shame. If, however, you guide them
with virtue and keep them in line by means of ritual, the people will
have a sense of shame and will rectify themselves.
in Analects 2.3; but Han says:
When a sage governs a state, he does not wait for people to be good in
deference to him. Instead, he creates a situation in which people find
it impossible to do wrong. If you wait for people to be good in deference to you, you will find that there are no more than ten good people
within the borders of your state. But if you create a situation in which
people find it impossible to do wrong, the entire state can be brought
into compliance. In governing, one must use what works in most cases
and abandon what works in only a few cases. Therefore, the sage does
not work on his virtue, he works on his laws.
Quoted in Eric Hutton, Han Feizi’s Criticism of Confucianism and Its Implications for Virtue Ethics, 5 J. MORAL PHIL. 423, 428 (2008).
89. ‘Li’ is a concept with a wide range of meaning, which may include: 1) the
narrowest—ritual or rites; (2) the broader—proper conduct; (3) all the institutions and relationships. Thus, Bodde argues that “li, in short, constitute
both the concrete institutions and the accepted modes of behavior in a civilized
state.” And “fa is a model or standard imposed from above (the heaven), to
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human beings to set up and enforce them, such that the ideal
sought by legalists may be distorted by the people who construct
the system. 90 The conquest of Confucianism over Legalism
dates back to the Han Dynasty and shows that governance by
laws has historically been downplayed by governance by virtues
in China.91
What is embedded in Confucianism is the impetus to coordinate the interrelationship between individuals.92 For Professor
Lin, such understanding can be readily identified in one key
element of Confucianism represented by the Chinese character “
仁.”93 The word itself is defined as “a good interpersonal relationship that is universally valid between two random persons.”94 In the words of systems theorists, such an objective can
be interpreted as an attempt to constrain chaos to a reasonable
extent so as to avoid catastrophes. Thus, Confucianism promotes a shift in focus from rational independent individuals to
the interrelationship between individuals, an approach which is
inherently in compliance with the Systems Theory approach.
The application of Confucianism in practice is guanxi, a
widely recognized norm of conduct, which is pervasive in social

which the people must conform.” See Bodde, quoted in Funk, supra note 87,
nn.15–16.
Laws are created for specific purposes and serve the governor who uses
them to control. In contrast, li, in compliance with human nature and cosmic
order, are characterized by universal validity. Thus, “a government based on li
functions harmoniously because the li, being unwritten, can be flexibly interpreted to meet the exigencies of any particular situation. A government based
on law creates contention because its people, knowing in advance what the
written law is, can find means to circumvent it, and will rest their sophistical
arguments on the letter rather than the spirit of the law.” See Funk, supra
note 87, at 2–3 n.4.
90. Id. at 2–3 n.4. Bodde summarized that “laws are no better than the men
who create and execute them.” See note 7 of n.4.
91. In the Han Dynasty, only Confucianism was revered whereas all the
other schools were dismissed. See Sor-hoon Tan, The Dao of Politics: Li (Rituals/Rites) and Laws as Pragmatic Tools of Government, 61 PHIL. E. & W. 468,
469–71 (2011).
92. Xi Lin, Adaptive Justice in the Chinese Context: Law Versus Commonsense (2011), 16 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 349, 367–70 (2011).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 367 (citations omitted).
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and economic life. 95 Economically, guanxi helps to reduce
transaction costs in repeated games. 96 The implications of
guanxi in economic activities shall not be deemphasized as
transactions are more often made in China on the basis of
guanxi affiliations than on arm’s length principles.97 Considering the high frequency of transactions in a fast growing
economy, the binding effect of such relational contracts is evident once disputes arise; whereby contractual parties may first
seek compensation through long-term contractual relationships
set up on guanxi to redress losses incurred at an earlier time.98
Within such a context of extensive self-enforcing, interlinked
relational contracts, the function of the rule of law may in
practice be circumscribed given the preference of agents to seek
recourse through such norms as guanxi. The subconscious
preference to avoid being present at courts may also be partly
explained by the widely welcomed and long-established tradition of mediation as an important alternative dispute resolution
method in China. 99 Moreover, the inefficient and
non-independent judiciary system may also lead disputants to
the recourse on non-judiciary solutions.100
In effect, the emphasis of guanxi throughout the history of
China promotes a value-based and norm-driven governance
95. Meling Wong, Guanxi Management as Complex Adaptive Systems: A
Case Study of Taiwanese ODI in China, 91 J. BUS. ETHICS 419, 419–21 (2010).
Wong argues that guanxi is bound to the five fundamental relationships, i.e.,
wulune—emperor-subject, father-son, husband-wife, elder-younger siblings,
and friend-friend. In other words, Wong thinks that all guanxi can be interpreted in wulune.
96. See Victor Nee, Norms and Networks in Economic and Organizational
Performance, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 85, 87 (1998); see Wang, supra note 1, at 49–
50; Anastassios Karayiannis & Aristides Hatzis, Morality, Social Norms and
the Rule of Law as Transaction Cost-Saving Devices: The Case of Ancient
Athens, 33 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 621 (2012).
97. Wong, supra note 95, at 421.
98. This is because initial loss may well be recovered and surpassed by the
benefits to be acquired in future contracts.
99. See Wang Liming, Characteristics of China’s Mediation System, 17 ASIA
PAC. L. REV. 67, 67–71 (2009).
100. This refers to alternative dispute resolution and political solutions such
as xinfang (letters and visits), or even protests before the government office
building. For letters and visits, see Carl Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to
Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103 (2006).
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structure.101 It should also be noted that the strong sinicization
that stubbornly persisted throughout the history of mainland
China may, to this day, effectively shield China from external
efforts for a change to Western culture.102 In fact, despite the
“onslaught of new legal and commercial regimes,” guanxi practices have even been flourishing in business transactions. 103
Hence, the long-established informal norms of guanxi continue
to have an important role in social activities in China. Nevertheless, these important informal norms shall not be employed
to minimize the role of law, but rather to seek the right combination between the soft norm and the hard law.104
B. The Dominance of the CCP
The second characteristic is the dominance of the CCP control,
which can be reflected in both the omnipresence of the CCP and
the hierarchical Nomenklatura personnel management system.
1. The Omnipresence of the CCP
The structure of the Chinese political system is better described as a hierarchical structure with the leading CCP on the
top and several democratic parties playing consultative roles
and showing full support for the leadership of the CCP. 105

101. Alex Chan & Angus Young, Chinese Corporate Governance Regime from
a Historical-Cultural Perspective: Rethinking Confucian System of Governance
(Oct.
3,
2012)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
www.ssrn.com/abstract=2156300.
102. See generally HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA (2011).
103. Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, The Resilience of Guanxi and Its New Developments: A Critique of Some New Guanxi Scholarship, 170 CHINA Q. 459, 459
(2002).
104. Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 498, 506 (2004).
105. Official introduction to the political system of China:
China’s political system is a system of multi-party cooperation and
political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of
China (CPC). The system was established and developed jointly by
the CPC and other democratic parties in their longtime commitments
to China’s revolution, its construction and reforms. The system has
become a basic political system in contemporary China.
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Within such a political governance structure, the omnipresence
of the CCP is apparent in a number of ways. First, the CCP is
the most populous party with more than 82.6 million party
members at the end of 2011.106 CCP members occupy the majority of the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) at different
levels. 107 Though most non-party members may select to be
representatives of the Chinese People Political Consultation
Conference (“CPPCC”), their roles are subject to the leadership
of the CCP. 108 Also notable is the recently promoted
The CPC-Led Multi-party Cooperation and Political Consultation System,
CRIENGLISH
(Sept.
30,
2007),
http://english.people.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6275039.html.
106. Zhou Yingfeng, The Number of Members of the Chinese Communist
Party Reached 82.602 Million at the End of Last Year, SINA (June 6, 2012),
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-06-30/152224688503.shtml.
107. From the eighth to tenth NPC, the proportion of the CCP among the
representatives of the National People’s Congress has been around 70%.
Considering that the representatives of National People’s Congress are selected from the representatives of Local People Congress, the ratio of CCP
among the representatives of Local People’s Congress is much higher. See
Jiajun Qiu (邱家军), Renda Daibiao Xuanju Zhong Zhengzhi Baguan Quan de
Yunxing Weidu (人大代表选举中政治把关权的运行维度 ) [The Dimension of the
Political Check in Electing Representatives of the National People’s Congress],
6 FUDAN ZHENGZHI XUE PINGLUN (《复旦政治学评论》) [FUNDAN UNIV. POL. SCI.
REV.] (Mingming Chen ed., 2008). This is the case even though a ratio of 65%
was inserted in Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Zuo Hao Difang Geji Renda
Huanjie Gongzuo de Tongzhi (中共中央关于做好地方各级人关大换届工作的通知
) [Notification on Carrying out Election at Expiration of Office Terms] (in
September
1992),
CPCS
(Sept.
24,
1992),
available
at
http://www.e-cpcs.org/newsinfo.asp?Newsid=10117.
108. This has been maintained through a series of documents from the party.
The widely referred to sources include the Opinion of the CCP Central Regarding the Insisting on and Perfecting the System of Multiparty
Co-Operation and Political Consultation under the Leadership of the CCP in
1989 and the Opinion of the CCP Central Regarding the Further Strengthening of the System of Multiparty Co-operation and Political Consultation
under the Leadership of CCP 2005. Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jianchi he
Wanshan Zhongguo Gongchandang Lingdao de Duodang Hezuo he Zhengzhi
Xieshang Zhidu de Yijian (中共中央关于坚持和完善中国共产党领导的多党合作
和政治协商制度的意见) [Opinion of the CCP Central Regarding the Insisting on
and Perfecting the System of Multiparty Co-Operation and Political Consultation under the Leadership of the CCP in 1989], available at
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64107/65708/65722/4444523.html;
Zhonggong
Zhongyang Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Zhongguo Gongchandang Lingdao de
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“Three-Represents,” meaning that the CCP represents (1) society’s most advanced productive forces; (2) advanced culture; and
(3) the needs and interests of the greatest majority of the Chinese population.109 This shows that the Party has become more
inclusive and expansive than ever in attracting elites with different backgrounds across different classes of society.110 Second,
the CCP’s presence is felt in social life through the CCP Constitution, which dictates the establishment of branches of the
Party wherever there are three party members in any organization, be it a joint venture, a law firm, a private company, or
institutions in the judicial system.111 Third, there is a hierarchical structured Political-Legal Committee under the CCP
Committees at different levels.112 The members of such comDuodang Hezuo he Zhengzhi Xieshang Zhidu Jianshe de Yijian (中共中央关于
进一步加强中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度建设的意见) [Opinion of
the CCP Central Committee regarding the Further Strengthening of the
System of Multiparty Co-operation and Political Consultation under the
Leadership of CCP 2005] (Issued by the Central Committee of the Communist
Party
of
China,
Feb.
18,
2005)
(China),
available
at
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/102565/182142/10993406.html.
Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jiaqiang Renmin Zhengxie Gongzuo de Yijian
(中共中央关于加强人民政协工作的意见) [Opinion of the CCP Central regarding
the Strengthening of the Work of the System of Multiparty Co-Operation and
Political
Consultation
in
2006],
available
at
http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34952/4155357.html; Zhonggong Zhongyang
Guanyu Jiaqiang Xinxingshi Xia Dangwai Daibiao Renshi Duiwu Jianshe de
Yijian (中共关于加强新形势下党外代表人士队伍建设的意见) [Opinion of the
CCP Central Committee regarding the Further Strengthening the Construction of Non-CCP Personnel under the New Situation in 2012]. For a brief review, see Xiaoying Yu, The History and Trend of the Institutionalization and
Normalization of the Multiple Party Cooperation in China, 6 J. CENT. INST.
SOCIALISM 48 (2012).
109. See Full Text of the Constitution of Communist Party of China,
(Oct.
25,
2007),
available
at
XINHUANET
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/25/content_6944738.htm.
110. See Cheng Li, The Chinese Communist Party: Recruiting and Controlling the New Elites, 3 J. CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 13, 14–15 (2009).
111. See Constitution of Communist Party of China, supra note 109, art. 29.
Primary Party organizations are formed in enterprises, rural areas, government organs, schools, research institutes, communities, social organizations,
companies of the People’s Liberation Army, and other basic units where there
are at least three full Party members.
112. See SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41007, UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM (2012), available at
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mittees are heads of judiciary organs at different levels, and
because judiciaries are supervised by and are responsible for
NPC at different levels, the influence of the CCP may in fact
undermine the independence of the judicial system.113
Given the omnipresence of the Party, economic agents in
China proactively follow an “if you can’t beat them, join them”
approach by seeking opportunities to be elected or attracted as a
representative either of the People’s Congress at different levels
or of the CPPCC.114 This is a mutually beneficial process. For
economic agents, joining in the club with elites who hold strong
powers in accumulating and distributing resources provides
them with a better chance to take advantage of more insider
information.115 Thus, the Party can conveniently achieve the

http://china.usc.edu/App_Images//crs-2012-understanding-china-political-syst
em.pdf.
113. See Fu Hualing, Autonomy, Courts and the Politico-Legal Order in
Contemporary China, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CHINESE CRIMINOLOGY
76–88 (Liqun Cao, Ivan Y. Sun, & Bill Hebenton eds., 2013).
114. Currently there is no specific law on CPPCC. However, the preamble to
the Constitution of the PRC (XIANFA， 宪法) states:
The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a broadly
based representative organization of the united front which has
played a significant historical role, will play a still more important
role in the country’s political and social life, in promoting friendship
with other countries and in the struggle for socialist modernization
and for the reunification and unity of the country.
XIANFA, pmbl. (1982) (China). The members of the CPPCC are selected representatives of different walks of life and with social influence. For a brief
summary of the system, see People’s Political Consultative Conference of the
PRC, UNIV. OF MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS LIBRARY, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ppcc.html.
115. Empirical evidence shows that political connections bring additional
benefits to entrepreneurs. Wu et al. found that private firms with politically
connected managers perform better and receive more tax benefits from local
governments than those without such managers. In addition, politically connected managers are more likely to be assigned to underperforming local State
Owned Enterprises. See Wenfeng Wu, Chongfeng Wu, Chunyang Zhou & Jun
Wu, Political Connections, Tax Benefits and Firm Performance: Evidence from
China, 31 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 277 (2012); Hong Bo, Political Appointments of
Managers in China (Univ. of London Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://csf.kiep.go.kr/download.ddo?type=c&att_seq_n=2377.
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political objective of diversified representation of the people and
can concurrently enhance its control of the Party.116
Alternatively, the omnipresence of the Party transforms potential political conflicts between the different parties into those
between different factions within the Party.117 It is thus reasonable to worry that the intensive conflicts within the Party
may lead to its collapse. However, the fact is that short of a
hegemonic faction, a rational choice for factions is to cooperate
with each other for common benefits. Furthermore, internal
improvement and alternation of party leaders help the CCP to
avoid the closed style of government observed in Muslim countries and sidestep the potential pitfalls of democracies where the
opposing parties do not contribute to meaningful debates, but
merely debate to oppose.118 Last but not least, the collective
leadership also forestalls the one-man leadership of the past by
promoting “considerable bargaining and maneuvering for factional advantage.” 119 In other words, neither the similarity
among different factions within the Party is strong enough to
lead the system into a dying equilibrium, nor is the difference
between factions strong enough to lead the system into total
chaos.120 Instead, efficiency and rationality in decision making
may still be enhanced under the one party control system by

116. This is further enhanced in the recent Opinions issued by the CCP
Central. See Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jiaqiang Xinxingshi Xia Dangwai
Daibiao Renshi Duiwu Jianshe de Yijian (中共关于加强新形势下党外代表人士
队伍建设的意见) [Opinion of the CCP Central Committee regarding the Further Strengthening the Construction of Non-CCP Personnel under the New
Situation in 2012]; Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqian Dangguan
Rencai Gongzuo de Yijian ( 中共中央关于 进一步加强党管人才工作的意见)
[Opinion of the CCP Central Committee regarding the Further Strengthening
the Work of Control of Talents by the CCP], available at
http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2012/0926/c64387-19120321.html.
117. See Zheng Yongnian, Why the Chinese Communist Party Will Not Collapse, STRAIT TIMES, Sept. 12 2012, at A23, available at
http://newshub.nus.edu.sg/news/1209/PDF/CHINESE-st-12sep-pA23.pdf.
118. Id.
119. LAWRENCE & MARTIN, supra note 112.
120. This is not to say that internal democracy has already achieved its
desired efficacy. For instance, self-monitoring has been far from satisfactory,
which in turn seriously undermines the efficacy of the internal democracy.
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both expanding the wide coverage of party members and promoting internal democracy within the Party.121
2. The Nomenklatura System
The dominance of the CCP is further enhanced by the institutionalized Nomenklatura system. Transplanted from the
former Soviet Union, the Nomenklatura system refers to the
institutional arrangements on personnel management through
which the Party has the power to decide the list of potential
candidates for key positions, both in the government and the
party’s own hierarchy, as well as to nominate qualified personnel.122 Since 1980, the system has been extended to party
committees at lower levels.123
The Nomenklatura system covers a wide range of personnel—from political positions to positions in judiciary organs,
academic institutions, and enterprises.124 For instance, judges
in the judiciary system and directors of state-owned enterprises
(“SOEs”) are all covered by the Nomenklatura scheme.125 On
the one hand, they are party members and regulated by the
Nomenklatura scheme.126 On the other hand, they must per-

121. See Zheng, supra note 117.
122. John Burns, China’s Nomenklatura System, 36 PROBS. COMMUNISM 36,
36 (1987).
123. Central Committee Organization Department, “Notice on the Repromulgation of the Job Title List of Cadres Managed by the Party Central Committee, 1980,” in which the Party committees at lower levels were also required to do the same. See Burns, supra note 122, at 37.
124. For a list of the job titles covered, see Burns, supra note 122 at 42–45. A
relevant concept is BianZhi, which is usually translated as “establishment.”
The two concepts are different. BianZhi clarifies what departments and positions are included in an administrative setup whereas the Nomenklatura
system tells which job titles are under the party control. See Kjeld Brødsgaard,
Cadre and Personnel Management in the CPC, 10 CHINA: INT’L J. 69, 76 (2012).
125. For the list of job titles covered by the Nomenklature System, see
Burns, supra note 122 at 42–45.
126. See Burns, supra note 122; see also Hon S. Chan, Cadre Personnel
Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990–1998, 2004 CHINA Q.
703 (2004).The so-called cadres must be “both red and professional,” or both
politically adamant and technically professional (you hong you zhuan, 又红又
专). See Fengcheng Yang (楊凤城), Guanyu “You Hong You Zhuan” Wenti de
Lishi Pingjia (关于 “又红又专” 问题的历史评价) [A Historical Review of the
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As shown, non-party leaders cannot be found in ranks higher
than the Bureau Level. It is fair to say that the Nomenklatura
system today helps the Party achieve a highly controlled personnel administration system with an extensive coverage, the
role of which cannot be minimized due to “its importance for the
Party patronage and social stability.”130 A combined reading of
the omnipresence of the Party and the Nomenklatura system
tells us that a unified central leadership with a level-by-level
hierarchical structure has been institutionalized not only within
the Party but also in the wider administrative system of government.131
3. Adaptation of the Party
The omnipresence of the Party and the strong personnel control under the Nomenklatura system not only helps to establish
and uphold the leading position of the political system among
the three systems of China, but also fosters a very strong operational closure of the CCP-dominated political system. Internally, the structural coupling of the political system with the
other two systems shows a one-way radiation. As shown in the
Constitution, the single-party controlled political system demands both a national economy dominated by state-owned
economy and a legal system serving the policies and interests of
the Party.132 Conversely, the influence of the economic and legal
systems on the reform of the political system is limited.133
Externally, the structural coupling of the Chinese political
system with the political system of other countries is rather
130. Despite a short break during the Cultural Revolution period, the
scheme has long been in existence. During the period of the Cultural Revolution, the intensive conflict within the party incapacitated the functioning of
the system. John P. Burns, “Downsizing” the Chinese State: Government Retrenchment in the 1990s, 175 CHINA Q. 775, 802 (2003).
131. Lisheng Dong, Central-Local Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect (Univ. of Nottingham, China Pol’y Inst., Discussion Paper No. 16, 2007),
available
at
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/discussion-papers/discussion-pap
er-16-central-local-relations.pdf.
132. See XIANFA, pmbl., arts. 1, 5, 6 (1982) (China).
133. See Joseph Cheng, China: Little to No Political Reform, EAST ASIA
FORUM
(Oct.
11,
2011),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/10/11/china-little-to-no-political-reform/.
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weak and again manifests itself in a one-way mode by radiating
outward.134 In fact, the experience of the former Soviet Union
during the transition at the end of the 1980s taught China a
lesson on how not to act—the Soviet Union’s abrupt and simple
change of its system without a complementary socio-political
environment resulted in a bitter experience.135
It is true that the development of the legal and economic systems may impose more intensive pressure on substantive reform of the political system.136 Still, the amount of delay needed
to effect changes may also save enough time for the Party to
reform from within. In fact, the Party has been undergoing
adaptable reform.137 For instance, inner-party democracy has
been promoted ever since Mao’s era and deemed the “lifeblood of
the Party.”138 By introducing such measures as multi-candidate
134. This is in the sense that the structure of the Chinese political system is
stubbornly resistant to external pressures. The Chairman of the National
People’s Congress Standing Committee, Bangguo Wu, stated that China will
not follow the Western path and would prefer a “no political change” policy.
See Zheng Yongnian, Where Does the Chinese Communist Party Go from Here?:
Challenges and Opportunities, 10 CHINA: INT’L J. 84, 85 (2012). Professor
Zheng argues that the CCP is rather open internally but closed externally. The
internal openness is achieved by intra-party democracy.
135. See generally Popov, supra note 6.
136. As quoted by LI, a survey of 80,000 people conducted by the Organization Department of the CCP in 2008 showed that one third of the Chinese
populace was not happy with the way the CCP leaders were selected or the
performance of the CCP leaders. See Cheng Li, Intra-Party Democracy in
China: Should We Take It Seriously?, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Fall 2009,
at
12,
available
at
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM30CL.pdf.
137. For that, Nathan’s summarization is apt:
[F]our aspects of the CCP regime’s institutionalization: 1) the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics; 2) the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the
promotion of political elites; 3) the differentiation and functional
specialization of institutions within the regime; and 4) the establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal that
strengthen the CCP’s legitimacy among the public at large.
See Andrew Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 6, 6–7 (2003).
138. The phrase was introduced on the 16th Party Congress in 2002. For a
critical review of the Inner-Party Democracy, see Joseph Fewsmith, Inner-Party Democracy: Development and Limitations, CHINA LEADERSHIP
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elections, decision making by votes, and institutionalized
management of the cadres, it is expected to achieve a more
transparent Party life.139 In addition, the collective leadership
invigorates dynamic factional politics, with the result that internal democracy may lead to greater institutionalization of the
inner-party democracy, thus further enhancing the Party’s
control. 140 As one professor observed, “China has not moved
away from socialism, but has rather kept the socialist brand and
applied it in a more expansive way.”141
The end result of such a nearly single-direction structural
coupling may well be a stultified political system, which may
further hinder or destroy the progress made in the economic
system and the legal system. For instance, even though political
and social reform had already begun since the 16th CCP Congress in 2002, the reform is to a large extent aimed at supplementing or complementing the results achieved by economic
reform and perfecting the environment for economic reform.142
However, as Premier Wen once warned: “Without the success of
political structural reform, it is impossible for us to fully insti-

MONITOR,
Winter
2010,
at
9–10,
available
at
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM31JF.pdf; Li, supra
note 136, at 2, 7. Li argues that the Inner Party Democracy is not merely
rhetoric, and the concrete steps implemented until now may further invigorate
the party. Meanwhile Fewsmith warns that monitoring from below may not be
possible if the current cadre management scheme is in place as following orders from above is rewarded whereas responding to the demands of below is
downsized. Fewsmith further projects that the inner party may well function
as a passive response to the critical situations rather than a proactive reform
from within, as the term indicates.
139. See generally Zheng, supra note 134.
140. See Li, supra note 136, at 7–8.
141. See Zhang, supra note 84, at 53.
142. This is still the case after the promulgation of the Resolution on Several
Key Issues in Comprehensively Deepening the Reform on the third Plenum of
the Eighteenth CCP Committee. See Zhuoyuan Zhang, The Key to Comprehensively Deepen the Reform is the Reform of Economic System, CHINA SOC.
SCI.
TODAY,
Nov.
27,
2013,
available
at
http://www.csstoday.net/xueshuzixun/guoneixinwen/86239.html. Even though
a radical political reform was not possible, as what happened in the former
Soviet Union, the reform in political system has been introduced at times
when the political system severely constrains the development of economy.
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tute economic structural reform.”143 Viewed from this perspective, the adaptation of the political system is relatively passive
rather than proactive.144
C. The Symbiosis of Strong Central Control and Gradual Deregulation
Strong central control is the third sui generis Chinese characteristic to address. At the time when the country was founded,
the objective to develop heavy industry, the necessity to guarantee agricultural provisions and supplies, and the requirement
to supply public goods all made centralization both economically
and politically indispensable.145 However, the heavy workload
at the central government and the unnecessary complications
arising from the information asymmetry under the command
economy led to decentralization in 1957. 146 However, serious
143. Premier Wen Jiabao Meets the Press, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://gh.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t915342.htm. See also Minxin Pei,
China: Can Economic Growth Continue Without Political Reform?, in
STRATEGIC ASIA 2006-07: TRADE, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND SECURITY 303 (Ashley
J. Tellis & Michael Wills eds., 2007).
144. See Zheng Yongnian, China, an Emerging Power, Is Exploring Its Own
Development Model, CHINA ECONOMIST (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1532106.
145. For a detailed discussion of the cycles of deregulation and centralization
and the implications on the development of China, see Yifu Lin, Ran Tao &
Mingxing Liu, Decentralization and Local Governance in China’s Economic
Transition, in DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 305, 307 (Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee eds., 2006). See also
Chunli Shen, Jing Jin & Heng-fu Zou, Fiscal Decentralization in China: History, Impact, Challenges and Next Steps, 13 ANNALS ECON. & FIN. 1 (2012). For
Shen et al., the fiscal reform in Chinese history can largely be divided into the
central control system (1949–1978), the fiscal contracting system (1978–1993),
and the later tax-sharing system (1994–present).
146. See Justin Yifu Lin, Ran Tao & Mingxing Liu, Decentralization, Deregulation and China’s Growth in Transition, in LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 467, 468–71 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds.,
2013). The Third Plenary Session of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party
of China serves as an indicator of the first wave of decentralization by delegation of more power from the central to the local governments. Specific
measures included the delegation of nearly all SOEs to local governments;
planning on a regional basis was given preference over central planning on a
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coordination failures called for centralization again only two
years later. 147 The ensuing economic stagnation reignited efforts to decentralize in the 1970s and, in turn, the investment
boom arising from discretions at local levels resulted in another
round of centralization.148
As before, the re-centralized governance structure was again
identified as one of the main obstacles to economic development
at the beginning of reform. 149 Deregulation had since been
promoted to liberate productivity.150 As one main technique to
deregulation, fiscal reform carried out in 1980 required local
governments to seek the fiscal balance on their own.151 Local
governments then began to do their utmost to promote economic
development, resulting in self-contained and sufficiently diversified provincial economies, which indicate that intensive competition among different provinces may persist.152
By invigorating local economies through inter-provincial
competition, deregulation has contributed to astonishing eco-

national basis; a five-year revenue sharing scheme was introduced along with
enhanced local tax authority.
147. Id.
148. Id. This is the so-called second wave of decentralization, the indicator of
which is the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Congress in December 1978.
Several features were similar to those of the first wave of decentralization.
149. See Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC
NEWS
(Oct.
10,
2008),
Central
Committee,
BEIJING
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/special/third_plenum_17thcpc/txt/2008-10/10/con
tent_156226.htm.
150. Id.
151. See Shen et al., supra note 145. This is the “fiscal contracting system”
between 1980 and 1985, through which revenue and expenditure were divided
between the central and local governments and each local government was
given responsibility for balancing its own budget. Taxes were accordingly
categorized into the central government revenue, and revenues were shared
according to a prefixed proportion between the central and the local governments. In 1985, the measure of profit remittance to the government by SOEs
was replaced by that of income taxation.
152. Shen Liren (沈立人), Dai Yuanchen (戴园晨), Woguo Zhuhou Jingji de
Xingcheng ji Qi Biduan he Genyuan (我国”诸侯经济”的形成及其弊端和根
源) [Formation, Defect and Origin of “the Economy Divided by Dukes or Princes
under Emperor” in China], 3 ECON. RES. J. 12 (1990); Alwyn Young, The Razor’s Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People’s Republic of
China, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1091, 1105 (2000).
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nomic growth.153 However, the imbalance between the central
and local governments imposed a serious threat on the authority of the central government, and centralization was re-ordered
in 1994.154 Indeed, the whole picture is better understood as
“cycles of centralization and deregulation,” throughout which
the central government has been holding the ultimate say on
the timing and extent of deregulation. 155 Thus, even though
deregulation to local governments can be seen as a main feature
of recent administrative reform, local discretion has always
been subject to review from the strong center.156
Considering the discretion enjoyed by local governments, the
power of the central government is of special importance in
China. First, strong central control provides an effective
mechanism for structural coupling between local governments,
which enjoy discretion that provides many opportunities for
experimentation. 157 This strong central control can limit the
effects of experiments within the constraints established by the
central government, enabling successful experiences to be extended to a wider scope, with negative effects arising from unsuccessful experiments accordingly limited to experiment
points.158 Second, the central control aids in fighting against
unpredictable crises, a feature that is especially important given
the fitness landscape of a fast growing economy. For instance,
153. See Lin et al., supra note 146, at 484–86.
154. Shen et al., supra note 145, at 8–11.
155. Cunyi Yin (殷存毅)& Nengli Xia (夏能礼), “Fangquan” huo “Fen Quan”:
Woguo Yang—Di Guanxi Chu Lun (“ 放权 ” 或 “ 分权 ” ：我国央 – 地关系初论 )
[Deconcentration or Decentralization: On the Relationship Between the Central
and the Local Government in China], 12 «公共管理评论» [CHINA PUB. ADMIN.
REV.] 23 (2012).
156. Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Did Government Decentralization
Cause China’s Economic Miracle?, 58 WORLD POL. 505, 507–08 (2006).
157. See Sebastian Heilmann, Maximum Tinkering under Uncertainty: Unorthodox Lessons from China, 35 MOD. CHINA 450, 457 (2009). But see Cai &
Treisman, supra note 156. According to Cai and Treisman, it is the competition at the center among factions with different ideological predispositions and
local connections rather than the competition among locals that explains the
economic growth. This view however does not change the argument that it is
the trials at the local level that provide the dynamic to adapt to a point of
efficiency.
158. Sebastian Heilmann, From Local Experiments to National Policy: The
Origins of China’s Distinctive Policy Process, 59 CHINA J. 1, 2 (2008).
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the CCP Politburo met in October 2008, immediately after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, and released its economic stimulus package worth 4 trillion RMB in November 2008.159 An effective control from the central government thus secures the
effective intervention required for speedy effective solutions.
Third, a strong central government is essential for achieving the
objective of fast growth per se, in terms of accumulating and
distributing resources in a weak market economy while securing
a stable environment for the adaptation of the whole system.
For instance, the highly centralized planned economy helped
China at the foundation of the country build its heavy industry,
guarantee supply and procurement of grain, and provide public
goods. 160 Similarly, it is also the strong central control that
transferred the wealth accumulated from the TVEs to avoid
widespread unemployment for numerous employees of the
SOEs, thus saving time for the ensuing reforms.161 Likewise, a
strong central control is also necessary for securing a stable
environment, in which the country can initiate and continue its
economic reforms.162 Thus, the strong central control in combination with the gradual deregulation to local governments
provides a suitable strategy to achieve the adaptive efficiency of
the whole system.

159. China’s 4 Trillion Yuan Stimulus to Boost Economy, Domestic Demand,
(Nov.
9,
2011),
XINHUANET
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-11/09/content_10331324.htm.
160. See Lin et al., supra note 145.
161. Fan Gang, Incremental Changes and Dual-Track Transition: Understanding the Case of China, 9 ECON. POL’Y 99, 109–10 (1994).
162. Dam argues that the continuation of leadership in China saved China
from the potential pitfalls arising from Eastern European countries. Kenneth
W. Dam, China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic
Growth? 34–35 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 275, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=880125.
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III. IMPLICATIONS ON THE ADAPTATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Adaptation of the Legal System
1. Adaptation with the Dominant Political system
In stark contrast to the checks and balances scheme in the
West, analyzing China’s one-party political system is integral to
understanding Chinese legal development. Since the immediate
and overarching political system overshadows the legal and
economic development, the structural coupling between the political system and the legal system is almost always one way. In
fact, the paramount dominance of the Party in the judiciary
system can be observed in terms of finance, personnel, and operation.163 For instance, local governments finance local courts,
and most members of the Adjudicative Committee in each court,
a Committee which is in charge of influential cases, are CCP
members.164 In combination with long-established social guanxi, the intrusion of politics seriously undermines the independence of the court system.165
Alternatively, the lack of confidence in the judiciary system
drives disputants directly to the government for a solution. As
the populace inherently thinks the government is the ultimate
settler of disputes, the populace may intentionally sidestep the
legal system.166 This is especially true when cases deal with

163. Ignazio Castellucci, Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics, 13 ANN.
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 35, 56 (2007).
164. See ALBERT CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 201–03 (4th ed. 2011). According to Article 11 of
the Organic Law of the People’s Courts 1979, a Judicial Committee shall be
established in each court by the standing committee of the relevant People’s
Congress. Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of China,
CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207253.htm (last
visited Jan. 12, 2014). The membership of a basic People’s Court is comprised
of a president, vice presidents, and judges. Id.
165. Jerome A. Cohen, Network Solutions, S. CHINA MORNING POSt (Mar. 4,
2010), http://www.scmp.com/print/article/707506/network-solutions.
166. The letter and visit is one field example. For a critical view of the letter
and visit in China, see Minzner, supra note 100, at 105; see also Carl Minzner,
China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 938 (2011).
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sensitive sociopolitical and socioeconomic issues. 167 Additionally, the Party’s policies may easily be integrated into laws and
regulations wherever ambiguous existing laws and regulations
leave opportunities for the Party to intervene.168 In combination
with these elements, the Nomenklatura scheme and the increasingly expansive party membership enhance the enforceability in social life of Party policies, which may in fact function
as a “living constitution.”169 Just as one scholar properly argues,
the Chinese legal system can only be appropriately understood
with its indispensable political element.170
Thus, in comparison with the rather autonomous nature of
legal systems in Western society, the operational closure of the
legal system within China may have to be constrained, if not
handicapped, by its nearly one-way structural coupling with the
leading political system.
Besides, the dominance of the political system in China also
implies a delicate adaptation of the legal system. The recently
promoted Three-Supremes—meaning “the supremacy of the
Party, the supremacy of popular interests, and the supremacy of
the Constitution and law”—within the judiciary system can be
cited as a revealing example here. 171 As an echo to the
Three-Represents and the pursuit to establish a harmonious
state, the president of the Supreme People’s Court proffered the
Three Supremes. 172 On the one hand, the three-supremacy
167. Fu and Peerenboom tried to tell the difference between political cases
(“directly challenging the authority of the ruling regime”), politically sensitive
cases (“affect[ing] socio-political stability, economic growth, international
recognition or reputation or the broad public interest”) and labor cases (using
collective and different dispute resolution procedures). Fu Yulin & Randall
Peerenboom, A New Analytical Framework for Understanding and Promoting
Judicial Independence in China, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS
FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 95–133 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010).
168. Id. at 96–97.
169. Id.
170. Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Changes in the
World’s Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5 (1997).
171. Taisu Zhang, The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting the Supreme People’s
Court of China, 25 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 4–5 (2012).
172. The phrase derived its origin from a speech by the then President Jintao
Hu at a National Conference on Political-Legal Work convened by the CCP’s
central Political-Legal Committee. President Hu said: “In their work, the
grand judges and grand procurators shall always regard as supreme the par-
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merely describes the established dominance of the political
system among the three systems, as the supremacy of the Party
has always been placed in the front. But on the other hand, the
three-supremacy reveals how the Chinese judiciary system responds delicately to the current environment with a strong
Party control and strong economic performance. Indeed, the
inclusion of the supremacy of the Constitution and law can only
be deemed politically expedient within an environment with
stringent political constraints. At the very least, the supremacy
of laws has successfully been maintained and, more importantly, juxtaposed with the other two supremacies, thereby
securing a niche for the legal system in the Party state.
The dominant political system may also contribute to special
features in the lawmaking process. It is observed that legal
development in China has more often than not been the product
of CCP administrative policies. 173 Laws are introduced only
when opportunities mature, such that it is usually the case that
“econom[ic] necessity drove policy reform,” leading legislation to
legitimatize successful experiences and to further supplement
the institutional predilection for the economic development.174
For instance, foreign trade had been promoted in practice ever
since the open door policy was introduced, whereas the Foreign
Trade Law was only promulgated a decade later in 1994.175
This approach, whereby policy leads legislation, is also apparent in the evolution of laws on SOEs. SOEs, originally known
as State Run Enterprises (“SREs”), had long been deemed gov-

ty’s cause, the people’s interest and the constitution and laws.” This was further enhanced by a series of promotions within the judicial system by the then
president of the Ministry of Justice. For a brief comment, see Jerome Cohen,
Jerome Cohen on the “Three Supremes,” HARVARD L. BLOG (Oct. 23, 2008),
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/guorui/2008/10/23/jerome-cohen-on-the-three-su
premes.
173. See Linda Yueh, ENTERPRISING CHINA: BUSINESS, ECONOMIC, & LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1979, at 12 (2011).
174. Id.
175. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], WIPO Lex. No.
CN124, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6584 (last
visited Nov. 18, 2013). Foreign Trade Law was first introduced in 1994 but
amended in 2004.
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ernment organs rather than independent legal persons.176 In
order to reform those inefficient SREs, the state introduced a
series of administrative policies to enhance the autonomy of the
SREs, policies which consummated in the Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Several
Issues Concerning the Reform of the Economic System in
1984. 177 Even though productivity had generally improved
among SREs, state subsidies still supported many inefficient
SREs.178 It is thus no wonder that the Enterprise Bankruptcy
Law (“EBL”) mainly targeting SREs was not introduced until
1986, two years after the policy was first explored in a northeastern city.179
176. See Liufang Fang, China’s Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 149 (1995). For a summary on the history of SOE reform, see
Yueh, supra note 173, at 102–03.
177. See Yueh, supra note 173, at 102–03.
178. Yiping Huang, Wing Thye Woo & Ron Duncan, Understanding the Decline of China’s State Sector, 9 MOST: ECON. J. ON E. EUR. & THE SOVIET UNION
1, 5 (1999). Huang et al. observed that the initial efforts to promote autonomy
of and introduce more initiatives of managers were largely ineffective by
measuring the size of total factor productivity (“TFP”) growth. In fact,
the total losses of industrial SOEs rose from 4.2 billion yuan in 1978
to 34.9 billion yuan in 1990 and 72.7 billion yuan in 1996; an astonishing annual growth rate of 17 percent between 1978 and 1996. It is
widely estimated that, in the 1990s, about one third of SOEs made
explicit losses and another one-third made implicit losses.
(citation omitted) id. at 5. Huang et al observed that “Direct subsidy to
loss-making SOEs rose from 18.2 billion yuan (1.2 per cent of GNP) in 1988 to
84.4 billion yuan (2.4 percent of GNP).”Id.
179. This refers to the nationally well-known bankruptcy of Shenyang Anti-Explosion Equipment Factory in 1984. Article 1 of the law tells the importance of the law to the SRE reform:
This Law is devised to meet the need for development of the socialist
planned commodity economy and economic system reform, to promote
the operation of all-people owned enterprises, to strengthen the economic responsibility system and democratic administration of
all-people-owned enterprises, to improve management, to enhance
economic efficiency, and to protect the legal rights and interests of
creditors and debtors.
For the law and brief comment, see Douglas G. Boshkoff & Yongxin Song,
China’s New Bankruptcy Law: A Translation and Brief Introduction, 61 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 359, 359–62 (1987); see also Mark E. Monfort, Reform of the
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The Contract Responsibility System, a supplementary measure to promote productivity, through which managers reached a
contract with the state, was first experimented and then promoted nationwide by the enactment of the Provisional Regulations on Contracting Management System in SOEs in 1988.180
The importance of all such efforts was to cultivate a common
understanding that SOEs are separate legal persons with their
own autonomy.181 With such efforts, the opportunity to introduce a law on SREs became mature. The Law on Industrial
Enterprises Owned by the Whole People (“LIEOWP”) was then
passed in 1988 despite the fact that SOEs, as the main organization form, had been in existence ever since the foundation of
the country.182
With experience accumulated in the development of the private economy and related foreign investment, the Company Law
of 1993 further facilitated the corporatization of SOEs, through
which most small and medium sized SOEs had been privatized.183 By the time the SOE reform had gone through the phase
of “Grasp the Big and Let the Small Go,” inefficient small and

State-Owned Enterprises and the Bankruptcy Law in the People’s Republic of
China, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1067, 1080–81 (1997).
180. By such a system, the CEO or leader of the SO, who was the legal representative of the SOEs, signed contracts with the government, the basic
principle of which were stipulated in s5 of the Provisional Regulation, i.e., to
“lock the minimum amount of profit for the SOEs to pay to the State,” and
entitle SOEs “to keep the remaining profit, but [remain] liable for paying the
fixed amount to the State even if [the] SOEs have not made satisfactory profit.” For a more detailed discussion, see Cindy Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 8–11
(2002).
181. See Yueh, supra note 173, at 102–03.
182. Section Two of the Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole
People reads: “The property of the enterprise shall be owned by the whole
people (equivalent to the notation of ‘State’), and shall be operated and managed by the enterprise with the authorization of the State in line with the
principle of the separation of ownership and managerial authority.” Zhonghua
Remin Gonheguo Quanmin Suoyou Zhi Gongye Qiye Fa (中华人民共和国全民所
有制工业企业法) [Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., April 13, 1988,
effective Aug. 1, 1988), ch. II, art. 2.
183. While Western scholars usually employ the word privatization, corporatization is used in China.

204

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:1

medium sized SOEs had already failed at the efficient use of
assets and labor.184 As a result, the narrow application of the
EBL of 1986 became increasingly outdated.185 The Bankruptcy
Law was then revamped in 2006, reflecting not only the change
of the attitude of the government towards the SOE reform but
also the requirements of a developing private economy and more
intensive foreign related investment.186
The above examples show that policies, compared with laws,
are good at applying the experimental approach and facilitating
the learning process. However, a side effect of this first approach to administrative policy is that laws necessary for a free
market economy may not be introduced easily. For instance, a
well-defined property law has long been claimed as a precondition to economic development, yet the introduction of the Property Law was not possible until 2007, almost thirty years after
the open door policy was introduced in 1978, due to the ideological constraints on the protection of private properties. 187
Also, as a key law in setting up a free market, the Anti-Trust

184. The policy was introduced in 1997 at the 15th Communist Party Congress, Naughton summarized succinctly: “In ‘letting the small go,’ policy-makers were giving local governments much greater authority to restructure their own firms and, in particular, to privatize or close down some of them
. . . . [L]ocal government-run factories were not only much smaller than those
of the central government, but also much more exposed to competitive pressures and consequently much less profitable. In fact, in the mid-1990s all of
the state-owned small and medium enterprises put together were losing
money.” BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH
301–02 (2007). For empirical evidence of the policy, see Samuel Ho, Paul
Bowles, & Xiaoyuan Dong, “Letting Go of the Small”: An Analysis of the Privatisation of Rural Enterprises in Jiangsu and Shandong, 39 J. DEV.STUD. 1
(2003).
185. As the economy was still strictly a command economy from the central
government and state-owned enterprises were the main organization form, the
law emphasizes the goal of imposing responsibilities on persons responsible for
business failure rather than the equitable and efficient distribution of assets.
See Boshkoff & Song, supra note 179, at 361.
186. See Yueh, supra note 173, at 119–20. This also refers to the bankruptcy
of Shenyang Anti-Explosive Equipment Factory in 1984.
187. Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property
Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 317,
323–37 (2008); see also Gerald P. O’Driscoll Jr. & Lee Hoskins, Property
Rights: The Key to Economic Development, 482 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (2003).
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Law (“ATL”) 188 was only introduced fourteen years after the
introduction of the Unfair Competition Law. It is not to say that
anti-trust issues had not been in existence when China first
introduced the Unfair Competition Law, but instead that strong
political resistance from the vested interest groups successfully
postponed the introduction of the ATL, which aimed to achieve
the anti-administrative monopoly among SOEs. 189 Consequently, despite the prioritization of economic goals, an inactive
political system is still able to postpone the introduction of laws
necessary for a free market economy.
Nevertheless, as the market economy develops further, intrusions of the political system into the functioning of the legal
system, and the negative effects associated with such activity,
may well be retreating. Indeed, when Peerenboom studied the
implications of the strong role of the Party on the development
of Chinese administrative law before China was admitted to the
WTO, he observed that “[r]ather, the Party’s main relevance to
administrative law lies in its ability to promote or obstruct
further political and legal reforms that would strengthen the
legal system, but could also lead to the demise of the Party or to
a drastic reduction in its power.”190
After the accession of China to the WTO, structural coupling
with the international world further improved the development
of the Chinese legal system.191 In order to perform its obliga-

188. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Longduan Fa (中华人民共和国反垄断
法) [Anti-Monopoly Law of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’ l
People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) (China), available at
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=6351&lib=law&SearchKeyword=anti
-trust&SearchCKeyword=.
189. While the local protectionism was not successfully curbed in the former
UCL, the ATL, with a special target at anticompetitive (local) government
actions, is at least on paper a powerful dose on (administrative) monopoly to
secure a competitive socialist market economy on a historically
state-controlled market. See Salil K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust
Functionalism: Reconsidering China’s Antimonopoly Law, 49 VA. J. INT’L L.
379 (2009).
190. Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of
Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of
China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 167 (2001).
191. See Julia Ya Qin, Trade, Investment and Beyond: The Impact of WTO
Accession on China’s Legal System, 191 CHINA Q. 720, 724–37 (2007).
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tions as a member of the WTO, both substantive and procedural
administrative laws have already gone through a series of revisions.192 More importantly, the conception of due process and
rule of law has increasingly been accepted in the administrative
system.193 In addition, the development of specialized markets,
such as product factor markets, especially the financial markets, may dictate a stronger role of law due to stronger coupling
of the national economy with the established institutional environment of the West.194 For instance, to comply with the WTO
rules, China set up the China Banking Regulatory Commission,
192. See Ying Songnian (应松年) & Wang Xixin (王锡锌), WTO yu Zhongguo
Xingzheng Fa Zhidu Gaige de Jige GuanJian Wenti (WTO 与中国行政法制度改
革的几个关键问题) [WTO and Several Key Issues of China’s Administrative
Law Reform], ZHONGGUO FAXUE («中国法学») [CHINESE LEGAL SCIENCE] (2002)
(China),
available
at
http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-ZGFX200201001.htm; see also
Rongzhen Yang, Research of China’s Participation in the WTO Trade Policy
Review Process (Ind. Univ. Research Ctr. For Chinese Politics & Bus. Working
Paper
No.8,
2011),
available
at
http://www.indiana.edu/~rccpb/Working_Paper/Yang%20Rongzhen%20RCCP
B%208%20TPR%20PUB.pdf.
193. WTO significantly improved members’ domestic administration by
promoting such norms as transparency, participation, reason giving, and review. See Ljiljana Biulovic, Selective Adaptation of WTO Transparency Norms
and Local Practices in China and Japan, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 803, 809 (2008)
(quoted in Richard Stewart & Michelle Badin, The World Trade Organization:
Multiple Dimensions of Global Administrative Law, 9 INT. J. CONST. L. 556,
572–73 (2011)).
194. A unique character accompanying the astonishing economic growth is
the rather pessimistic development in the financial market. The economic
development in China can mainly be attributed to the development of (international) trade. But the incompatible development in financial markets, especially the development of the securities market, may again remind us of the
legal origin theories proffered by Rafael La Porta et al. See supra note 2. See
also Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, Law and Finance:
Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653 (2003). Beck et al.
summarized that the current theories on why legal origin matters for financial
development can be categorized into two groups, i.e., the political channel
(starting by looking at the relationship between investors and the state and
then at the implications on the development of property rights and financial
markets), and the adaptability channel (the ability of the legal system to adapt
to the increasing demands of financial development). According to Beck et al.,
the adaptability of a legal system to the evolving economic conditions matters
more for the development of the financial market. See id. at 654–55.
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the China Security Regulatory Commission, and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, providing an institutional
base for financial market reform in China, and by issuing detailed regulations, these regulatory authorities are better prepared for the reform of the Chinese capital market.195
2. Adaptation on the Dual Track
For the past thirty years, one apparent characteristic of the
development of the Chinese legal system was the existence of
dual track systems, which made possible a trial-and-error approach. One example of the dual track exists in substantive laws
regulating economic activities involving foreign parties and
those for domestic participants. For instance, Economic Contract Law 1981 and Foreign Parties Related Economic Contract
Law 1985 were only unified into the Unified Contract Law in
1999. 196 Also, the Joint Venture Law (“JVL”) introduced the
company as an organizational form for the purpose of attracting
foreign investment in 1979, whereas Chinese Company Law
(“CCL”) was only introduced in 1993.197 Detailed rules on the
establishment and annual reviews of companies with foreign
investment were also introduced so that the JVL could be under
scrutiny.198 The dual track in law conveniently drew a line be195. For example, the newly introduced Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (“QFII”) regulations not only permit foreign investors to invest in
Chinese securities markets but also help to improve the corporate governance
of listed companies. See Weihua Wu, Are Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors Real Investors or Speculators: Evidence from China (May 10, 2011)
(unpublished
article)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2056056.
196. The Technology Transfer Contract Law was also unified into the Contract Law 1999. David W. Hill, Recent Developments in Technology-Transfer
(May
1,
2006),
Laws
of
China,
FINNEGAN
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=091abd
88-0fd4-4d20-81e2-c1ece8c3fc3b.
197. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa (中华人
民共和国中外合资经营企业法) [Foreign Joint Venture Law] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979) (China); Zhonghua
Remin Gongheguo Zhuxi Ling ( 中 华人民共和国主席令) [Company Law]
(promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993,
amended Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (China).
198. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa
Shishi Tiaoli (中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例) [Regulations for
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tween laws for domestic agents and those for overseas investors,
and the experiences accumulated from foreign companies were
later successfully transplanted to the CCL 1993. 199 Even
though revisions of the CCL were made in 2005, special regulations on Joint Ventures as stipulated in the JVL still enjoy priority whenever there is a conflict between the JVL and the CCL
2005.200
Likewise, a similar dual track scheme can be found in arbitration regarding commercial disputes. In the past, the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and
China Maritime Arbitration Commission were devised to deal
with arbitration for disputes involving foreign parties, whereas
the Economic Contracts Arbitration Commission with its domestic divisions controlled the domestic arbitration.201 Considering the deficient court system, arbitration has long been preferred as an alternative to court proceedings.202 Such delineathe Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (promulgated by the St. Council, Sept. 20,
1983)
(China),
available
at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/2003010006
4563.shtml.
199. See generally Linda Yueh, Law in China’s Transition 13–15 (Int’l Soc’y
for New Institutional Econ., Working Paper, 2007), available at
www.isnie.org/assets/files/papers2007/yueh.pdf.
200. Chinese Company Law [C. CIV.], art. 218 (China), translated in CHINA:
COMPANY LAWS AND REGULATIONS HANDBOOK (International Business Publications rev. ed. 2012). Article 218 of the CCL 2005 states that “The limited
liability companies and joint stock limited companies invested by foreign investors shall be governed by this Law. Where there are otherwise different
provisions in any law regarding foreign investment, such provisions shall
prevail.” Id.
201. See Shi Weisan, Arbitration and Conciliation: Resolving Commercial
Disputes in China, 12 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93 (1989). A series of
surveys during this period teach Chinese governors vivid lessons, ranging
from the benefits of the separate legal personality of a company as an organizational form, to the autonomy of the manager to the internal governance of
enterprises. See Yasheng Huang, The Role of Foreign-Invested Enterprises in
the Chinese Economy: An Institutional Foundation Approach, in CHINA, THE
UNITED STATES, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 147 (Shuxun Chen & Charles Wolf,
Jr. eds., 2001).
202. The dual track scheme was relaxed only quite recently, when both types
of arbitration institutions were allowed to arbitrate both international and
domestic cases.
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tion between related domestic and foreign arbitration secures a
niche for arbitration of international disputes, while at the
same time requiring the maintenance of a separate domestic
arbitration practice. Learning between tracks thus helps to
improve domestic arbitration practices, and arbitration centers
in China are now all allowed to docket international cases.203
Apart from the above foreign-domestic double track, China’s
dual track also exists in laws regulating the state owned sector
and those on the private sector. It must be realized that the
existence of a private economy was not recognized in law until
1988, almost ten years after the economic reform.204 The delineation was employed not only to explore the viability of the
development of a private economic sector, but also to help the
then loss-suffering SOEs through a difficult time by transfer203. Donald Clarke, Peter Murrell & Susan Whiting, The Role of Law in
China’s Economic Development, (2007), in LOREN BRANDT & THOMAS RAWSKI,
CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375, 389 (2007). The Court of
Arbitration of China Chamber of International Commerce was established in
1956 and established branches in Shenzhen (1984) and Shanghai (1988).
INT’L
ECON.
&
TRADE
ARBITRATION
COMM’N,
CHINA
http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). The Arbitration
Law was passed in 1994, according to which local arbitration centers sprout up
at local levels. However, the law does not prescribe clearly whether these
arbitration centers can accept cases involving foreign factors. A Notification to
Clarify Several Issues relating to the Implementation of the Arbitration Law
of the PRC was issued by the General Office of the State Council in June 1996,
according to which arbitration centers at local levels can accept cases with
foreign factors as long as the parties select arbitration as a way to settle their
disputes. Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Guanche Shishi Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa Xvyao Mingque de Jige Wenti de Tongzhi (国
务院办公厅 关于贯彻实施中华人民共和国仲裁法需要明确的几个问题的通知)
(1996),
available
at
http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/9/9-2-1-09.html.
204. The First Amendment to the Constitution of 1982 was made in the first
Plenary Session of the 7th National People’s Congress in 1988. M. Ulric Killion, China’s Amended Constitution: Quest For Liberty and Independent Judicial Review, 4 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. REV. 43, 45 (2005). A new paragraph
was attached to Article 11, which reads, “The State permits the private sector
of the economy to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law. The
private sector of the economy is a complement to the socialist public economy.
The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the
economy, and exercises guidance, supervision and control over the private
sector of the economy.” XIANFA art. 11, §1 (1988).
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ring profits from the private sector and providing job opportunities for a large number of displaced employees of the SOEs at
the beginning of the reform.205 As large-scale unemployment
was successfully avoided, both the macroeconomic goals and
social stability had been maintained, a key element that contributed to the efficacy of the gradual approach in China.206
In sum, the merit of the dual track system is that the
co-existence of both the old and the new makes possible a guided
structural coupling, which can easily be set up between systems
under the two tracks. Such an approach not only helps to locate
the merits of systems under each track but also facilitates the
digestion of those merits between tracks, benefiting the search
for an appropriate growth trajectory for the whole system. What
cannot be downplayed in such a dual track system is the importance of the adaptive manager role of the government or
regulatory authority, which acts as a valve switcher for the
structural coupling and as the environment stabilizer so that
the intended learning and digesting can become reality.
3. Adaptation in Fast Transition
Laws in a fast growing economy are usually introduced as political expediencies. One revealing example will be helpful here.
For instance, prioritized economic goals of local governments led
to serious concerns of weak protection for employees, and in
order to address these concerns and pacify large-scale social
unrest, the new Labor Contract Law (“LCL”) was introduced at
the beginning of 2008.207 Nevertheless, ever since the LCL was

205. See Gang, supra note 161, at 115.
206. See Yueh, supra note 173, at 10.
207. Before the introduction of Labour Contract Law in 2008, the Labour
Law 1994 was the main reference. However, underpayment, or no payment of
employees, or the fraudulent and manipulative conduct of employers was the
norm. See Anita Chan, Labor Standards and Human Rights: The Case of
Chinese Workers under Market Socialism, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 886, 891–93 (1998).
The introduction of the LCL 2008 seriously constrains illegal acts such as
non-payment of wages in the private sector, especially for migrant workers,
which was increasingly acute and courted criticism from different sectors of
the society. See Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labour Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the People’s Republic of China, 30
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1050, 1053–54 (2006). For a general but percipient review
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in consultation stages, employers have complained about the
“overprotection” of employees.208 The increasing cost for labor
protection has since been a serious concern for Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (“SMEs”), which contribute the most to
the employment agenda of the country but are the most
hard-pressed to afford due protection to their employees.209
Indeed, creative reactions from the employers had immediate
effects on employees.210 Immediately before the law came into
effect, employees were laid off across the country or were fired
and re-employed through employment agencies at lower wages.211 Alternatively, employers may choose to relocate to other
of the LCL 2008, see Hilary Josephs, Measuring Progress under China’s Labor
Law: Goals, Processes, Outcomes, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 373 (2009).
208. In the consultation process, business organizations, and international
organizations specifically, worked against the drafts of the LCL. See Sean
Cooney, Sarah Biddulph, Li Kungang & Ying Zhu, China’s New Labour Contract Law: Responding to the Growing Complexity of Labour Relations in the
PRC, 30 UNIV. NEW S. WALES L.J. 788, 789 (2007). The increasing cost has
been a major concern for numerous small private companies. See Caifeng Liu,
New Labor Law Makes Firms Cautious to Hire, Fire, 4 CHINA ECONOMIST 126
(2009), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract =1544208.
209. For a comment on the Labour Contract Law on Foreign Invested Enterprises, see Monique Garcia, China’s Labour Law Evolution: Towards a New
Frontier, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235 (2009).
210. Haiyan Wang, Richard Appelbaum, Francesca Degiuli & Nelson Lichtenstein, China’s New Labour Contract Law: Is China Moving Towards Increased Power for Workers?, 30 THIRD WORLD Q. 485, 492–93 (2009).
211. See Yu-Fu Chen & Michael Funke, China’s New Labour Contract Law:
No Harm to Employment?, 20 CHINA ECON. REV. 558, 560 n.10 (2009). See also,
Yin Lily Zheng, It’s Not What Is on Paper, but What Is in Practice: China’s New
Labor Contract Law and the Enforcement Problem, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD.
L. REV. 595, 602–03, 603 n.52–54 (2009). Such practices can be observed in
both domestic companies such as Huawei (offered termination of existing
employment contracts to seven thousand employees) and foreign invested
enterprises such as Carrefour (resigned labor contracts) and Wal-Mart (dismissed workers in 110 purchasing departments). Bin Wu & Yongniang Zheng,
A Long March to Improve Labour Standards in China: Chinese Debates on the
New Labour Contract Law 7 (Univ. of Nottingham China Policy Inst. Briefing
Series Issue 39, 2009); Don Lee, New Workers’ Rights Thwarted in China, L.A.
TIMES
(Dec.
27,
2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/27/business/fi-chinalabor27/2; Jovita T.
Wang, Article 14 of China’s New Labor Contract Law: Using Open-Term Contracts to Appropriately Balance Worker Protection and Employer Flexibility, 18
PAC. RIM L. & POL. J. 433, 449 (2009).
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areas with lower wage levels.212 Due to the increased labor costs
associated with the LCL and the intense competition for limited
employment opportunities, employees may have no choice but to
accept lesser contractual terms, which defeats a major intended
protection under the LCL.213 Even worse, the law was promulgated just one year before the onset of the world financial crisis,
such that SME employers that have long functioned in labor
intensive export processing industries were further aggravated
as a downturn in international markets is reorienting those
SME exporters to seek an increasing share of the domestic
market.214
At the same time, employees are increasingly conscious of
their legal rights.215 Empirical data show that labor disputes

212. See Garcia, supra note 209, at 240–41, 248–49.
213. See id. at 248–50.
214. It is noted that the drastic shrinkage of demand for Chinese exports on
the European and American markets (in combination with the then ongoing
industrial restructuring within China) compelled more than 20 million rural
migrants back to their hometown. See Gyorgy Sziraczki, Phu Huynh & Steven
Kapsos, The Global Economic Crisis: Labour Market Impacts and Policies for
Recovery in Asia 1–6 (Int’l Labour Org. Asia-Pacific Working Paper Series,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-asia/—-ro-bangkok/documents/pu
blication/wcms_110095.pdf. For implications of the 2008 financial crisis on
exports from China, see Qiuguang Hu & Hongying Li (胡求光与李洪英), Jinrong Weiji dui Zhongguo Chukou Maoyi Yingxiang de Shizheng Fenxi (金融危
机对中国出口贸易影响的实证分析) [Empirical Analysis on the Influence of the
Financial Crisis to Trade of China], 3 《国际贸易问题》 [J. INT’L TRADE] 3
(2010). Scholars also recommended that increasing demand on the domestic
market may serve as a solution. In fact, Joseph Stiglitz identified the danger of
export-led growth and recommended the development of a domestic market
early in 2007 before the financial crisis. See Joseph Stiglitz, China: Towards a
New Model of Development, 1 CHINA ECON. J. 33 (2008). For a general comment, see Fang Cai &Dewen Wang, Employment Should Top Crisis Agenda,
POPULATION & LABOR ECON. RESEARCH INST., CHINESE ACAD. OF SOC. SCIS,
available at http://iple.cass.cn/upload/2012/06/d20120604115932007.pdf (last
visited Jan. 7, 2014).
215. For a detailed study on the implications of the new Labor Contract Law
on Chinese workers, see Mary Gallagher, John Giles, Albert Park & Meiyan
Wang, China’s 2008 Labor Contract Law: Implementation and Implications for
China’s Workers (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 6542, 2013)
(noting that awareness of legal rights is increasing even among migrant
workers).
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have increasingly been brought to courts and arbitration tribunals, and that the number of cases with a plaintiff involving
more than ten employees has also been on the upward trend
ever since the promulgation of the LCL.216 Employees may intentionally postpone signing the legally required employment
contracts by dragging the negotiation process until the one-year
period terminates.217 Employees may also collectively threaten
216. For instance, Guangdong Courts filed nearly 160% more cases in the
first six months of 2008, while the arbitration tribunal received 300% more
labor disputes. For statistics, see Laodong Zhengyi Duofa Diqu de Jiben Shuju
(劳动争议多发地区的基本数据) [Annual Statistics on Labour Dispute Cases],
http://www.labournet.com.cn/ldzy/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). For comments,
see generally Jenny Chan, Meaningful Progress or Illusory Reform? Analyzing
China’s Labor Contract Law, 18 NEW LABOR FORUM 43 (2009); Edward Wong,
As China Aids Labor, Unrest Is Still Rising, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2010, at A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/world/asia/21chinalabor.html.
217. Article 82 of the LCL reads:
If an employer fails to conclude a written labor contract with an employee after the lapse of more than one month but less than one year
as of the day when it started using him, it shall pay to the worker his
monthly wages at double amount.
If an employer fails, in violation of this Law, to conclude with an
employee a labor contract without fixed term, it shall pay to the employee his monthly wage at double amount, starting from the date on
which a labor contract without fixed term should have been concluded.
Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, LEHMAN, LEE & XU,
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/labor/laborcontract-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
While it is true that it is usually employers that intentionally drag
along the negotiation process and lead to the break-up of the negation process,
employees may also intentionally take advantage of the law to compromise the
interests of employers, especially SMEs. See Liang Da (梁达), Jinfang Guyi bu
Qian Laodong Hetong de Shuangbei Gongzi Zhuanjia (谨防故意不签劳动合同
的’双倍工资专家) [Attention Shall Be Paid to “Double-Wage Specialists” Employees Who Intentionally Declined to Sign the Employment Contracts], 152
YIAN SHUOFA (《以案说法》) [LAW & CASES] 40 (2010). Xu Chen & Fei Liu (陈旭
与刘菲), Laodong Zhe Daode Fengxian yu Shuang Bai Gongzi Zhipei Zeren
Paichu (劳动者道德风险与双倍工资支配责任排除) [Moral Risks of Workers and
the Avoidance of Duty to Pay Double-Wage], 24 PEOPLE’S JUDICATURE （CASES)
《
( 案例研究》) 75 (2010). There is no clear stipulation on such issues in LCL. See
Yefang Qian & Hongxia Zheng, Shall Double-Wage Compensation Be Applied

214

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:1

to bring their disputes to arbitration tribunals if there is no increase in wages, signaling social unrest and incremental pressure from local governments on the employer.218
As a result, local governments have been struggling to strike
the right balance between the implementation of the labor law
and the strong initiative to pursue economic growth within a
stable social environment.219 Such a goal is not uncommon to a
fast growing economy, which is keen on further economic
growth whereas the success of growth can lead to hindrances in
the form of an increase in the importance of social concerns.220 A
decision, however, has to be made before potentially negative
effects develop into catastrophes and shift the whole system to a
different fitness landscape with unimaginable uncertainties.
Indeed, the current alternative to China’s growth is decelerated
economic development with increasingly serious consideration
of social concerns.221 Hence, even though economic growth is
still of importance in the current development agenda, the
newly introduced draft of the ECL apparently disregards the

to Cases Where No Written Employment Contract Can Be Reached Due to Negotiation?, CHINA LABOR, 51 (2011); Hao Wu & Tianli Wen (吴昊与温天力),
Zhongguo Difang Zhengce Shiyan Shi Gaige de Youshi yu Juxianxing (中国地
方 政 策 试 验 式 改 革 的 优 势 与 局 限 性 ) [The Merits and Demerits of Reform
Through Local Experimentations], 10 《社会科学战线》 [SOC. SCI. FRONT] 37
(2012); Zhansheng Gao, (高战胜), Wei Qianding Shumian Laodong Hetong shi
Laodongzhe erbei Gongzi Qingqiuquan de Shiyong Tiaojian Yanjiu ( 未
签订书面劳动合同时劳动者二倍工资请求权的适用条件研究) [Study on the Conditions to Apply the Right to Claim Double-Wage in Cases of Failure to Sign
Written Employment Contracts], 12 L. SCI. MAG. (法学杂志) 154 (2012).
218. This may first initiate media attention and then pressure on governments. See Yin Lily Zheng, supra note 211, at 614.
219. See Cooney, supra note 207, at 1066.
220. See generally Garcia, supra note 209.
221. Hu Jintao, Chinese President and General Secretary of the Cent.
Comm. of the Communist Party of China, Rep. to the Eighteenth Nat’l Cong. of
CPC, Part VII: Strengthening Social Development by Improving the People’s
Wellbeing and Making Innovations in Management (Nov. 12, 2012), available
at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/news/2012-11/19/content_159417
74.htm.
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negative concerns for economic growth and prioritizes the social
concern of employees.222
B. The Relevance of Rule of Law
One evident observation to be made is that the Western idea of
employing rule of law as a governance tool to constrain the supremacy of the government has long been a foreign concept to
Chinese culture. According to Professor Orth, rule of law as a
second feature was initially introduced to counterbalance the
supremacy of the central government, which historically was
the chief feature of political institutions of England. 223 With
separation of powers in place in the political system, rule of law
is effectively employed in the West to place limitations on the
different branches of government.
However, the absence of the separation of powers in the political system of China does not provide a suitable context for
transplanting Western-style rule of law.224 As described earlier,
the dominance of Confucianism over Legalism since the Han
dynasty indicates that rule by man historically dominated over
rule by law in China.225 While a strengthening of the rule of law
system was advocated for upon the death of Mao Zedong, it was
introduced with a strong communist ideological objective to

222. For comments referred to on the NPC official website, see New Labour
Law Means Better Image but at Higher Cost, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 2,
2008)
(China),
available
at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Legislation/2008-01/02/content_13878
65.htm. The draft of the Amendment to the Labor Contract Law has been
brought to the National Peoples’ Congress Standing Committee for discussion
on June 26, 2012. Improving the benefits for employees is one of the key issues
for revision. See China Amending Labor Law to Protect Contractors, XINHUA
NEWS
AGENCY
(June
27,
2012)
(China),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Legislation/2012-06/27/content_17265
82.htm.
223. At least at that time, the concept was not common to Western legal
philosophy. See John Orth, Exporting the Rule of Law, 24 N.C.J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 71 (1998).
224. This is also the reason why Professor Randall Peerenboom proffered the
division of the thick and the thin rule of law. See PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG
MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 3-6.
225. See Tan supra note 91.

216

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:1

serve party control.226 Moreover, this system was dismantled
almost completely during the Cultural Revolution, and immediately after the collapse of the Gang of Four, when rule by law
was introduced to legitimatize the new leadership, maintain the
social order, and enhance the control of the Party.227 The western conception of rule of law is thus merely an academic topic
with no practical observance in China.
Besides, China remains cautious in pursuing the complete
acceptance of Western-style rule of law after experiences accrued with foreign jurisdictions as a product of structural coupling. For instance, the experiences of geographically and culturally proximate Asian countries indicate that a dual track
system with the coexistence of both a well-developed commercial
law system and stringent constraints on civil and political rights
is a much more achievable objective for developing China.228
Additionally, China continues to work on building its sui generis
legal system within a socialist framework. 229 Thus, it is not
unfair to say that skepticism of rule of law informs Chinese
culture.230
In sum, the configuration of the operational closure and the
structural coupling of the Chinese legal system present a different picture from that of the West. For one thing, the operational closure of the Chinese legal system is enhanced by its
226. See ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 33–34 (rev. ed. 1998).
227. Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Socialist Legal Theory in Deng Xiaoping’s China,
11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 469, 475 (1997) (describing Deng’s pragmatic search for
a Chinese path with an objective “to free China from the constraints of both
Soviet ideas and Mao’s theory of the state and law” in Part B: Conceptions of
Law under Deng Xiaoping).
228. See Fu & Peerenboom, supra note 167, at 110.
229. Bangguo Wu, the top legislator of China, in his work report of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress delivered at the second
plenary meeting of the first session of the 12th NPC at the Great Hall of the
People in Beijing, capital of China, announced that “We will comprehensively
advance law-based governance of the country, and enhance the important role
that the rule of law plays in national governance and social management.”
China’s Top Legislator Vows to Push ‘Rule of Law,’ Keep Power in Check,
NEWS
AGENCY
(Mar.
8,
2013),
available
at
XINHUA
http://english.people.com.cn/90785/8159917.html.
230. See generally Pat Chew, The Rule of Law: China’s Skepticism and the
Rule of People, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 43 (2005).
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long-established Confucian culture and the modern socialist
ideology. For another, given the strong outward radiating effect
of the Chinese political system, the independence of the Chinese
legal system cannot be achieved alone. While the further development of the economic system does require a favorable coevolution of the legal system, such positive effects are still
within the ambit of the socialist political system. Given that
“changes in formal law matter where prevailing cultural norms
say that formal law matters,”231 a foolhardy transplantation of
new laws or the audacious unconditional acceptance of rule of
law without consideration of the underlying legal tradition and
the institutional arrangements may just do a disservice.232
IV. COMPATIBLE SYSTEMS TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
A. The Role of Law
For the purposes of economic development, laws function as
both positive and negative constraints. As positive constraints,
laws and regulations facilitate economic development by introducing favorable laws and regulations, by providing suitable
dispute resolution, and by training more legal professionals. For
example, at the very beginning of Chinese economic reform, the
focus of legal reform was on the laws of attracting foreign investment, which provide more certainty than those on other
domestic legal relationships. 233 In addition, the Constitution
was amended in 1988 to accommodate new economic development, such as when changes to Article 10 relaxed a long restricted land policy and spurred foreign investment activities in
China by permitting that “the land-use right may be assigned in
accordance with the provisions of the law.” 234 Though rudi231. Rosa Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the Rule of
Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2322 (2002).
232. Katharina Pistor & Philip A. Wellons, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 283–84 (1999).
233. See Yuangzheng Cao, World Economic Restructuring and China’s Economic Transformation, in CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 25 (Shuxun Chen & Charles Wolf, Jr. eds., 2001).
234. Amendment to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, THE
NATIONAL
PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
OF
CHINA
(April
12,
1988),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2829.htm. .
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mentary in comparison with Western law, these efforts, in
combination with the political environment, served the purpose
of economic development effectively.
Alternatively, laws and regulations may restrict economic
growth. For instance, the introduction of Law on Environment
Protection235 and the mandatory disclosure requirement of environmental issues for publicly listed companies236 not only reflect the incremental serious concern for environmental issues
but also function as negative constraints on the single-minded
pursuance of economic growth without due consideration of environmental responsibility. In combination with tax preferential
treatments, the introduction of such laws may significantly direct fresh investment to cleaner industries.237
235. For a more detailed description of laws relevant to environmental cases,
Environment Protection Law (Art 41) and General Principles of Civil Law (Art
124) are relevant sources. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (
中 华人民共和国环境保护法) [Environmental Protection Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Dec. 26, 1987, effective Dec. 26, 1987) art. 41; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Minfa Tongze (中华人民共和国民法通则) [General Principles of the Civil Law of
China] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 14, 1986, effective Jan. 1,
1987) art. 124. The newly introduced Tort Law 2009 (effective as of July 2010)
provides further facilitation and more specific and powerful legal sources for
environmental cases (Chapter 8 of the China Tort Law). Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Qinquan Zeren Fa (中华人民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort Law of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009,
effective July 1, 2010) ch. 8. Cases can be initiated not only in civil law courts,
but in administrative and criminal courts as well.
236. Companies going through IPO and refinancing on the public capital
market must be reviewed and approved by the provincial Environmental
Protection Bureaus. See Guanyu dui Shenqing Shangshi de Qiye he Shenqing
zai Rongzi de Shangshi Qiye Jinxing Huanjing Baohu Hecha de Tongzhi (关于
对申请上市的企业和申请再融资的上市企业进行环境保护核查的通知) [Measures
on Review and Approval of Environmental Protection of Enterprises Applying
for IPO and Refinancing for Listed Companies] (issued by the Ministry of
Envtl. Protection of China, June 16, 2003, effective June 16, 2003). See also
Press Release, Ministry of Envtl. Protection of the People’s Republic of China,
MEP Calls for Public Comments on Guidelines for Disclosure of Environmental Information of Listed Companies (Sept. 14, 2010), available at
http://english.mep.gov.cn/News_service/news_release/201009/t20100926_1949
64.htm.
237. Tax preferential treatments can be located in Art. 36. Press Release,
Ministry of Fin. of the People’s Republic of China, Notice on Preferential
Treatments for Software Enterprises, by the Ministry of Finance and the Na-
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Laws also play an important role in curbing the race to the
bottom arising from deregulation. Unregulated competition
among local governments in searching for global maximums
may not be suitable for a fast growing economy. This is not only
due to the complexity of a natural evolution process but also
because of the spillover of costs across local boundaries. For instance, short-sighted focus on local economies after the decentralization in 1988 only led local governments to fragment the
national market into closed, stagnant patches.238 The Unfair
Competition Law was introduced in 1993 with a specific purpose of curbing the then notorious regionalism within the
country.239
B. The Supplementary Nomenklatura System
The political system and the legal system may supplement
each other in function. For instance, Hoff and Stiglitz argued
that the lack of a serious political demand for the rule of law
contributes to the postponed establishment of rule of law in
post-communist societies.240 According to this thesis, resource
tional
Tax
Bureau
(Feb.
22,
2008)
available
at
http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/282GovernmentofChina-R
esponsetoSecondSupplementalQuestionnaire-Attachment200.pdf.
238. Shen et al., supra note 145, at 31.
239. Article 30 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (1993) states that
If the government or its departments violate Article 7 of this Law to
force the others to purchase the commodities from the pointed manager, limit the others make a fair competition, or limit commodities to
transfer between regions, the senior government shall order to correct
these mistakes; If the fact is serious, the same level government organ or the senior government organ shall administratively punish the
person who bear the direct responsibility.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Fa (中华人民共和
国反不正当竞争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of China] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993)
art.
30
(China),
available
at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=648&CGid=.
240. Karla Hoff & Joseph Stiglitz, After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the
Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies, 94 AM. ECON. REV.
753 (2004). The power to control can be both positive and negative. Positive in
the sense of wealth accumulation and negative in the sense of stripping the
accumulated assets of others.
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controllers make both economic and political choices to safeguard their own earned interests. 241 By using their political
power to strip the assets of others, resource controllers can
achieve resource accumulation similar to that which would be
possible by making positive economic decisions under a sound
system of rule of law.242 The political institution favorable to
those vested interest groups may thus resist the introduction of
rule of law into the country.
The implication of this understanding is that a strong political
institution at least supplements, if not replaces, the rule of law
in accumulating and distributing resources.243 The applicability
of such a thesis can similarly be observed in China, where the
Nomenklatura scheme has long been employed in practice as a
tool to redress the deficiency of both the legal system and the
political system.244 For instance, when Clark and others studied
the weak role of formal legal institutions in China, especially a
weak scheme on property rights, they found the importance of
non-legal institutions to be strong. 245 In order to attract investment and retain investors, local governments compete in
providing preferential arrangements.246 In fact, due to the authority given to judges, and the extent of their discretion in
ruling,247 the enforcement of court decisions in a socialist polit241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Jan Smits & Michael Faure, Does Law Matter, An Introduction 6–9
(Maastricht European Private Law Inst., Working Paper No. 2011/35, Nov.
2011), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1950335.
244. Apart from Professor Clarke, discussed below, other scholars also identify the important role of the Nomenklatura scheme in achieving political
stability and economic growth. See Hon, supra note 126.
245. Clarke, et al., supra note 203. But notice that Clarke et al. also point out
the stronger than expected role of law in transactions: “in the area of transactions of goods and services, we present new data that show that the legal
system is more important than might be assumed, given the enormous emphasis that personal and social relationships have played in the literature
discussing markets in China.” Id. at 376.
246. For instance, more preferential tax treatment may be offered by the
local governments to attract foreign investment.
247. The triple discretion in courts identified by Professor Woo is just one
example of how the legal system coevolves with its environment. The first
discretion is discretion on facts, discretion which is conducive to locate substantive solutions to conflicts between parties. Discretion on facts however is
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ical legal system is “neither a neutral, technical issue, nor an
automatic consequence of law,” and both under- and
over-enforcement is possible according to the policy demands.248
In other words, the deficiency of the judiciary system may
largely be supplemented by the existing Nomenklatura scheme.
In parallel, when Wang and others compared the regional
variations of Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) within China,
they found that good economic fundamentals, or “factors contributing to a higher rate of return on investment,” may play a
more important role in attracting new investment.249 They also
found that government officials with long-term career visions
and concern of self-reputation also help to attract FDI in a weak
legal system. 250 In fact, a political and administrative environment favorable to overseas investors is seen as especially
desirable when it is accompanied by a weak legal system.251
Similarly, Professor Zheng also observed that “[a]t the practical
level, the protection of capital and property rights at various
levels in the Chinese government surpassed the rule of law.”252
The efficacy of employing the existing Nomenklatura scheme
as a way to achieve the intended reform objectives shall not be
underestimated. Once the economic performance of the area
administered by the local officials was included among the criteria of performance evaluation, thereby making a difference to
limited for the increasing consciousness of law and technology development.
The second discretion is self-interested discretion, by which personal relations
and non-legal factors are considered and balanced. This is what happens in
renqing cases or guanxi cases. The third discretion is ideological discretion,
where politically sensitive cases will be readily decided by following ideological
principles such as the four fundamental principles (as stipulated in Constitution 1982: “adherence to the socialist road, to the people’s democratic dictatorship, to the leadership of the Communist Party, to Marxist-Leninist-Mao
Zedong Thought”). The last discretion has the least freedom to change. See
Margaret Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in THE
LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 163, 163, 165–72 (Karen Turner, James
Feinerman & Kent Guy eds., 2000).
248. See Castellucci, supra note 163, at 59.
249. Xiaozu Wang, Lixin Xu & Tian Zhu, Foreign Direct Investment under
Weak Rule of Law: Theory and Evidence from China 9 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 5790, 2011).
250. Id. at 21.
251. Id. at 17–22.
252. See Zheng, supra note 144, at 6.
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the career path of local officials, the lack of rule of law may
provide chances for both over- and under-protection in comparison with the protection provided in formal law. In fact, the initial single-minded pursuit of economic prosperity may lead the
government to intentionally support formal enforcement via
arbitration or to threaten potential government sanctions. 253
Clark and others argue that the “political structure itself has
served as an alternative to the formal legal system in providing
a reasonable degree of security to certain non-state investors at
the local level.”254
Later, when the early fervor for economic growth cooled down
to include more social concerns, the Nomenklatura system was
again employed to achieve the intended reform objective. For
instance, even though environmental protection law has long
been introduced, its enforcement is still far from satisfactory.255
Personal interests, either in terms of finance, political promotion, or even bribery, all lead to its ineffective enforcement at
local levels.256 Nevertheless, when environmental protection is
included among the political performance assessment formula,
serious consideration of environmental issues by local governments may become a reality.257
Hence, within an institutional environment with a leading
political system dominated by a single party, the Nomenklatura
scheme supported by the Party has been effectively employed to

253. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2011).
254. Clarke et al., supra note 203, at 400.
255. See William Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of the Law in Addressing
China’s Environmental Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125 (1997); Robert
Percival, The Challenge of Chinese Environmental Law (U. of Md. Sch. of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-40, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1277290; Jason E. Kelley, Seeking Justice for Pollution Victims in China: Why China Should Amend the Tort Liability Law to
Allow Punitive Damages in Environmental Tort Cases, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV.
527 (2011).
256. See Patricia Ross McCubbin, China and Climate Change: Domestic
Environmental Needs, Differentiated International Responsibilities, and Rule
of Law Weaknesses, 3 ENERGY & ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 200, 228–29 (2008).
257. See Environmental Law “First Amendment”: Strengthening the Government Act, CHINESE NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. (Oct. 16, 2012),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zgrdzz/2012-10/16/content_1739473.htm.
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supplement the deficient legal system for the purpose of economic development. If it is true, according to the theory of Hoff
and Stiglitz, that the political elites in developing countries, in
comparison with their counterparts in developed countries,
have more institutional specific investment and benefit more
from the established institution,258 it will be hard for developing
countries to establish a new institution so as to counteract those
vested interests. A more feasible choice is to take advantage of
the existing institutional arrangements. Such a realization also
suggests that the role of the legal system in a country prioritizing economic development is linked more to the flexibility of
the legal system to adapt to the local institution than to the
attributes of the legal system per se. 259 In other words, the
compatibility of the function of the different systems within an
institutional environment may be more important than the
quality of any individual system.
C. The Importance of the Strong Central Control
The coexistence of a strong central control and the
well-established Nomenklatura system facilitates an efficient
learning process for the whole system. For one thing, deregulation to local governments provides bountiful opportunities for
maximum regulation “tinkering” at local levels whereas the
strong central control intentionally encourages or cossets such
creativity.260 For instance, the three main experiments at local
levels that contributed to past economic success, i.e., the
house-hold responsibility system from Fengyang in 1978, the
Special Economic Zone in Guangdong and other coastal areas,
and the SOE reforms in Sichuan and Hunan, all secured vigorous support from the central government in their initial
stages.261
For another, the hierarchical structure under strong central
control provides an adaptable institutional framework for the
258. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 253, at 238.
259. Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D.
West, Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 676, 678 (2003); Daniel
Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 167 (2003).
260. See Heilmann, supra note 157, at 454–57.
261. See Cai & Treisman, supra note 156, at 514–19.
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experiences accumulated within experimental localities to be
transmitted to other regions upon success. Given the detrimental implications brought by the unregulated free competition between provinces, structural coupling between local governments is thus of special importance to achieve sustainable
economic growth. 262 In practice, effective structural coupling
can be achieved in several ways. First, by introducing administrative measures or issuing party orders, the results of local
experiments can be shared across the nation.263 Second, coupling can be enhanced by personnel movement of government
officials between municipalities. 264 Former experience accumulated by government officials either at other provinces or at
the central government may also be employed across boundaries. Third, by intentionally introducing laws, limitations on
inter-provincial structural coupling may at least be constrained.265
The ultimate effect is that local diversity may calculatedly be
promoted, but within the constraints or the grid established by
the central government. Viewed from that perspective, policymakers at higher levels may accordingly function as gatekeepers and advocators for useful, locally generated innovations.266
Thus, the combination of inter-provincial competition and
strong central control provides an appropriate institution for
China to achieve the adaptive efficiency of the whole system.
262. Sebastian Heilmann, Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise,
43 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 1 (2008).
263. Id.
264. This is can be attributed to the Nomenklatura system, through which
the central government may dispatch and move personnel according to the
plan of the national economy as a whole. For the role of Nomenklatura system
in Chinese economic development, see Hongbin Li & Li-an Zhou, Political
Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control
in China, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1743 (2004).
265. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Fa (中华人
民共和国反不正当竞争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec.
1,
1993)
art.
30
(China),
available
at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=648&CGid=;
Anti-monopoly Law (promulgated by Presidential Order No. 15, effective Aug. 1,
2008)
(China),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=182375.
266. See Heilmann, supra note 157, at 457.
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For this, Professor Heilmann’s remark is pertinent: “It is precisely the dialectical interplay between dispersed local initiative
and central policy making—maximum tinkering under the
shadow of hierarchy—that has made China’s economic governance so adaptive and innovative from 1978 to 2008.”267
In consequence, distortions from a free market economy may
be partially redressed by a strong political (administrative)
system in practice.268 Such understanding indicates that a totally “laissez-faire” market economy in combination with a
well-established rule of law may not be compatible with the socialist economy in China. In fact, structural coupling with the
economic systems in other countries also shows that the role of
government intervention is necessary. 269 The intermittent financial and/or economic crises at least provide evidence that a
free market economy pursued in the West is not without its
detriments.270 To the Chinese government, the invisible market
hand must be balanced with the indispensable visible hand of
the government. The fate of a national economy is thus dependent not on whether the invisible hand of the market is
strong enough to function freely but on how the two hands in
cooperation can achieve the objective.
In essence, the key issue here is that the decision-making
process is no longer an ex ante “process of setting rigid standards based on comprehensive rational planning,” but an ongoing
process of “experimentation using continuous monitoring, as-

267. Id. at 458.
268. Robert W. Fogel, Why China Is Likely to Achieve Its Growth Objectives
14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12122, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12122.
269. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 253.
270. Some objectives of financial market regulation include determining to
what extent law can help control financial chaos, and why the protection of the
financial system itself should also be included, other than for the maximization of economic efficiency, see Steven Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos:
The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L. REV., 815 (2012). To what extent
shall the law penetrate economic life, see Bernadette Meyler, Economic
Emergency and the Rule of Law (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research
Paper Series No. 06-045 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=944618.
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sessment, and recalibration.”271 Viewed from this perspective,
the central government or the party plays an important role of
manager in guiding the adaptive walk.
D. Dynamic Compatibility to Achieve Sustainable Growth
A review of economic growth in China shows that the Chinese
government intentionally takes advantage of existing conditions
for the purpose of achieving institutional flexibility. The deficient legal system had partially been redressed by the political
and administrative system. As stated earlier in this article, the
“meta-rights—access or rights to property rights” under the
unique Chinese political and administrative system clearly
counterbalanced the lack of protection for property rights under
the property law.272 In other words, a deficient legal system, an
indicator of low institutional quality, does not necessarily indicate a lack of institutional flexibility for the whole system. For
instance, the continuing local experiments were only possible
without legal constraints.273 At the beginning of reform, policy
experimentation at local levels could be carried out as long as a
report was approved by the central government that the intended experiments were in compliance with the spirit of the
central policy.274 Thus, the deficient legal institution may have
enhanced institutional flexibility by promoting competition
among local governments, a key contributor to the economic
growth in China.
The legal system is just one important component of the meta
governance, the aim of which is to achieve the sustainable
growth of whole system.275 The past experience of China at least
271. Even though Ruhl is describing the recent development in American
court management, the quotation is applicable to the trial-and-error style
adaptive walk. See Ruhl, supra note 20, at 428.
272. This thus corresponds to the argument of de Soto, who argues that what
matters in the economic development of the United States is not ‘‘property
rights per se but meta-rights—access or rights to property rights.” Davis,
supra note 75, at 308.
273. Hao Wu & Tianli Wen, supra note 217, at 37.
274. Id.
275. See Jianxing Yu & Ziying He, The Tension Between Governance and
State-Building, 16 J. CHINESE POL. SCI.1 (2011). The current focus on governance study shows that both the anarchy of exchange as in the market
mechanism and the hierarchical administrative structure as in a firm or a
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showed that the compatibility among systems were more important than the quality of any one within the environment.
Still, the compatibility itself is due to the co-evolution of subsystems within the system and that of the systems constituting
the environment of the system. For instance, as the Chinese
market becomes more integrated with the rest of the world, we
observe incremental pressures on China to adapt its administrative system to international practices, as evidenced by China’s need to reform, if not reshuffle, its administrative system of
government in order to meet the requirements for accession to
the WTO. 276 As the domestic economy further develops, the
State Council even claimed at the end of 2012 that the government shall withdraw itself from matters in which either
citizens or the market are capable of self-regulating, and prohibit pre-imposed administrative review for items which can be
reviewed ex post or through other administrative measures.277
While it is still a slogan at this stage, the pronouncement of such
principles indicates that the government has been managing to
adapt the system to the development of the market economy.

state may overshadow the importance of governance, a concept which should
jump out of the traditional constraints of both the free market and the hierarchical style. Rather, governance emphasizes self-organization, a horizontal
network and partnership, and “refers to mechanisms and strategies of
co-ordination in the face of complex reciprocal interdependence among operationally autonomous actors, organizations, and functional systems.” Id. at 3.
Moreover, the current governance study “indicates that a one-track approach
favoring one over the other is inadequate to guide or explain the practice of
governance today.” Id. But the authors leave open the question of how China
can transition from an authoritarian government to the governance they define in the article.
276. Donald Clarke, China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for
Compliance, 2 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 97 (2003); Donald C. Clarke,
China: Creating a Legal System for a Market Economy 12–13 (George Wash.
Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 396, 2007),
available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1097587.
277. Guowuyuan Guanyu Diliupi Quxiao he Tiaozheng Xingzheng Shenpi
Xiangmu de Jueding (国务院关于第六批取消和调整行政审批项目的决定) [Decision by the State Council to Revoke and Adjust Projects under Administrative
Approval (the Sixth Batch)], (promulgated by the St. Council, Oct. 10, 2012)
(China),
available
at
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-10/10/content_2240096.htm.
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However, one set configuration of compatible subsystems is
only suitable for a given fitness growth mode, which is captured
by one set of attractors and attractor basins. Once a new growth
mode is introduced, the whole system will escape from the
capture of the existing attractors and attractor basins and a new
configuration suitable for the new growth mode will be required.
Recent evidence shows that China is moving on a new growth
mode, according to which a moderate growth rate will be pursued with a focus on developing a consumption-led growth mode
and improving social welfare.278 Such a shift indicates that the
initial compatibility among and between the political (administrative) system, the economic system, and the legal system,
which are suitable to single-minded economic growth, may need
to be changed. In consequence, as the market economy further
develops, the legal system may become more autonomous and
the configuration of the autopoiesis of the legal system may
change accordingly. Still, it is noteworthy that no less emphasis
should be imposed on comprehensive reform—a mindset suitable to achieve the adaptive efficiency of the whole system.279
CONCLUSION
The pursuance of a comprehensive reform package per se reveals that the Chinese government has long been following a
systems view of the reform process. The above discussion reveals that it is the compatibility among the systems and the
supplementary roles played by the other systems that partly
redress the deficiency of the Chinese legal system and may accordingly provide a better explanation for the persisting economic development in China. This is not a single-direction
simplistic linear determination but a networked non-linear coevolution with a strong sensitivity to the initial conditions of the
systems in concern. The current economic success within the
existing environment may thus persist, rather than collapse, on
the condition that adaptable coevolution among the sub-systems
can be successfully achieved. In other words, the compatibility
of a system with the other systems in its environment may be
278. Yiping Huang, China’s New Growth Model, E. ASIA FORUM (Apr. 14,
2013), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/14/chinas-new-growth-model.
279. See Hao Wu & Tianli Wen, supra note 217, at 44.
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more important than the quality of any individual system in
concern.
Alternatively, Chinese development is not a result of a
well-designed plan but an adaptive management process—a
continuing recursive process of learning from field experience
and using that information to guide further development. 280
Due to the fast speed of transition, unexpected effects are the
norm but are overseen by China’s strong central control. On the
whole, the Chinese government largely functions as an effective
adaptive manager.
It is worth noting that the evolution of the market economy in
the West is a natural evolutionary development process whereas
the development of the market economy in China is an artificial
short cut. If the gradual adaptation process is long enough to
accommodate the Western-style evolution process, a more
pro-Western style rule of law could be expected. However, the
fact remains that a span of thirty years may be too short a period to achieve that purpose. Conversely, the recent successful
economic experience of China may reinforce the development
path of those sticky elements of the existing institution. If,
however, the sticky political system becomes more incompatible
with the other systems, the widely commended economic feat
will soon yield unexpected catastrophes, a result the government will try its best to avoid.

280. In a word, Chinese “development must be a process of learning, selective adaptation, and innovation.” Justin Yifu Lin & Yan Wang, China’s Integration with the World: Development as a Process of Learning and Industrial
Upgrading 4 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4799, 2008).

